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Abstract
This dissertation encompasses three papers. My first paper examines how one firm’s deci-
sion to unbundle its product affects its competitors’ pricing strategies. Existing literature discusses
the effect on prices of the unbundling firm, but previous work often ignores the asymmetric sce-
nario where one firm unbundles while the competing firm does not. I contribute to the literature
by modeling and empirically testing the asymmetric case of product unbundling on competitors’
prices using a large dataset of U.S. domestic airfares. My differentiated product model with add-on
pricing predicts a firm’s base good price, regardless of whether it unbundles its own product, will
be affected by competition unbundling. The predicted effect of competition unbundling could be
positive or negative depending on characteristics of the firms and market. The variation in timing
and implementation of bag fees among airlines during 2007-2009 provides a unique opportunity to
identify the effects of product unbundling. I find competitor bag fees lead to lower ticket prices for
a majority of airlines and routes. While the average effect is a 2% drop in ticket price, additional
evidence indicates the reduction in ticket price is larger on longer routes, flights with a connection,
and routes characterized as having a greater proportion of business travelers. These findings not
only reveal a more extensive impact of bag fees than previously thought, but also lend confirmation
of the theory which emphasizes the importance of a competitive effect of product unbundling.
My second and third papers explore the possible forces that led to the introduction of bag
fees in the U.S. airline industry. My second paper investigates whether the widespread introduction
of bag fees in the U.S. airline industry is consistent with the price discrimination story of add-on
fees. Existing theories on add-on pricing show price discrimination through an add-on fee increases
profits only when there is enough heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness to pay for the add-on. For
bag fees to be consistent with this theory, I hypothesize flight networks for bag fee charging airlines
saw an increase in the heterogeneity of consumers’ willingness to pay for bag-checking services prior
ii
to the introduction of bag fees. I test this hypothesis by analyzing the mix of routes and passengers
for each airline using ticket level data published by the Department of Transportation. In particular,
I approximate the number of business and leisure travelers flying on each airline over time to identify
the mix of these consumer types flying on each airline. The greater the mix of these consumer types
an airline faces, the more variation in consumers’ willingness to pay to check a bag. Although I do
observe changes in the overall composition of consumers for some airlines, I do not find conclusive
evidence of a change in demand in support of the theory. Furthermore, the inconclusive results do
not allow a rejection of the hypothesis, but instead, are likely a product of insufficient data.
My final paper investigates whether changes in costs led to the introduction of bag fees
in the U.S. airline industry. Along with the price discrimination story of add-on fees, economic
theory also suggests that the cost of producing the add-on is an important component of the firm’s
decision to charge an add-on fee. Bundling the add-on with the base good is profitable only when
the costs of producing the add-on are low relative to consumers’ willingness to pay for the add-on.
As costs rise, the potential profits of unbundling the add-on begin to outweigh those of selling only
the bundled product. Therefore, I hypothesize that the marginal costs of transporting passengers’
checked baggage increased prior to 2007 and the introduction of bag fees. Using data from the Bureau
of Transportation Statistics, along with insight from various other sources and industry reports, I
evaluate changes for several costs associated with bag-checking services. I find evidence of increases
in the following costs relevant to bag-checking services: fuel costs, costs associated with mishandled
baggage, and the opportunity costs of cargo space on passenger service flights. These trends are
consistent with the story of increasing marginal costs as a driving force for the introduction of bag
fees.
iii
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Chapter 1
The Competitive Effects of
Product Unbundling: Evidence
from U.S. Airlines
1.1 Introduction
Beginning in the early 2000s, the majority of carriers in the U.S. airline industry began to
alter their business models and adopt an “a la carte” pricing strategy. Previously, carriers’ ticket
prices included checked bags, meals, and drinks, but now these items are often sold for additional
fees.1 Baggage fees have a large impact on airlines’ profits, accounting for over $17 billion in
revenue from 2010-2014.2 The introduction of bag fees also attracted negative attention from the
media and government agencies voicing concern over higher costs for travelers. An economic flaw
of these critiques was they often neglected to consider the effect of bag fees on ticket prices. The
competitive nature of the airline industry makes its unlikely ticket prices were unaffected by bag fees.
Consideration of their impact on prices complicates the economic analysis of bag fees and motivates
the question: how do bag fees affect ticket prices?
1There are some exceptions to the examples, such as longer flights will sometimes include a free meal.
2While bag fee revenues only account for roughly 3% of passenger related revenues from 2010-2014, many industry
experts believe bag fees (among other ancillary revenues) are the main reason for airlines returning to positive profits.
See, for example, “Airline profits are up, thanks to everything but airfares,” Forbes, September 9, 2014
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The introduction of a bag fee by an airline is likely to have two different price effects in
a competitive market.3 The first being the “own-price effect” referring to the bag fee introducing
airline’s change in their own ticket price. The second being the “competitive effect” referring
to a competing airline’s change in ticket price in response to the new ticket price and
bag fee for the unbundling airline. Brueckner et al. (2015) investigate the own-price effect by
studying the gradual introduction of bag fees by U.S. carriers from 2008-2009.4 Economic theory
suggests when a firm moves from selling a bundled product to separately selling the base good and
add-on, the resulting base-good price is lower than the original bundled price. However, the new
total price (for both the base good and add-on) will now be higher relative to the bundled product
price.5
Brueckner et al. (2015) find a carrier’s average fare decreased by 3% when it introduced
a bag fee. The average drop in fares (equivalent to $5) was less than the bag fees charged during
their sample period ($15-$20), resulting in an overall increase in the effective price bag-checking
passengers paid relative to the bundled price. The findings of Brueckner et al. (2015) support the
theoretical predictions of the own-price effect of product unbundling; however, their analysis does
not account for the possibility of competitor bag fees affecting ticket prices.
In this paper I contribute to the literature by examining the effect of a firm’s product
unbundling on competitors’ prices. I construct a theoretical model of competitive add-on pricing
with two firms. Each firm offers a base product (flight) and a premium product (flight plus bag
check), where the difference between the base and premium price is defined as the add-on fee (bag
fee). Once prices are determined, consumers choose between firms and purchase one product variant.
The model gives predictions for both the own-price and competitive effect of product unbundling.
Previous work, most notably Verboven (1999), Ellison (2005), and Shulman and Geng
(2013), uses comparable models of add-on pricing but does not analyze the competitive effect of
unbundling.6 These papers focus on a simultaneous unbundling by both firms, in which each firm
3A market is defined by a route between two end-point cities.
4In the present paper and Brueckner et al. (2015), the focus is on bag fees for the first checked bag. Second bag
fees were introduced before first bag fees by all the bag fee charging carriers. Further, only a small percentage of
passengers check a second bag, so the impact of second bag fees is of less interest than first bag fees.
5This follows the standard price discrimination story found in the literature on bundling (e.g., Adams and Yellen
(1976), Schmalensee (1984), McAfee et al. (1989), and Venkatesh and Kamakura (2003)) and more recently, the
literature on add-on pricing (e.g., Fruchter et al. (2011) and Brueckner et al. (2015) for a monopoly; Verboven (1999),
Ellison (2005), and Shulman and Geng (2013) for competitive markets).
6Verboven (1999) examine price markups when two competing firms unbundle their products, while Ellison (2005)
and Shulman and Geng (2013) determine the profitability of add-on fees when some consumers perceive the add-ons
to be free.
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chooses optimal base-good prices and add-on fees. This approach does not consider the competitive
effect which is most apparent when one firm unbundles while the other does not.7 My analysis
differs by assuming the choice of the add-on fee is exogenous to the firm’s decision and derives equi-
librium prices under the asymmetric scenario: one firm charges an add-on fee and the other does
not. Through price comparisons across scenarios of symmetric and asymmetric add-on fee policies,
I am able to identify the competitive effect of product unbundling.
I show that the introduction of a bag fee by one airline alters the pricing decision for all
airlines in the market. When a bag fee is present, the consumer’s choice is influenced by the value of
bag-checking services, resulting in a proportion of consumers no longer checking a bag. The division
among consumers (bag-checkers and non-bag-checkers), along with the lower ticket price and higher
total price by the unbundling airline, impacts the competitor’s optimal ticket price. In particular,
the competitor could lower their ticket price to compete for non-bag-checking consumers or they
could raise their ticket price to target bag-checking consumers and gain higher net revenues. The
ambiguous direction of the competitive effect depends on model parameters, such as the value and
cost of bag-checking services, and motivates the empirical work of this paper.
I use a 10% sample of U.S. airfares from 2007-2010 to estimate the effect of competitors
unbundling bag-checking services on ticket prices. The introduction of bag fees allows me to empiri-
cally analyze the competitive effect of product unbundling due to the time variation in each carrier’s
adoption of bag fees and variation in competition across routes.8 Estimation of the own-price effect
is limited due to the fact carriers do not vary bag fees across routes. In contrast, a carrier’s compe-
tition and the competitor bag fees it faces do vary across routes. For these reasons I focus on the
estimation of the competitive effect of bag fees by including carrier-time fixed effects (dropping the
lone indicator for own-bag-fees).9
My findings suggest a carrier’s ticket price will be 2% lower, on average, in a market with at
least one competitor charging a bag fee compared to a market where no competitors charge a bag fee.
7Verboven (1999) acknowledges the possibility of asymmetric add-on fee policies among firms, however, symme-
try is imposed for simplicity. Shulman and Geng (2013) briefly mention the possibility of reaching an asymmetric
equilibrium, but do not give a detailed analysis.
8The empirical work of this paper contributes to a short list of studies finding evidence for add-on pricing theories.
Besides the more recent analysis of unbundling in Brueckner et al. (2015), only a few papers have provided evidence of
add-on pricing theories. Pierce and Winter (1996) use data on newspaper firms to estimate the probability of whether
a firm will adopt an add-on fee. Verboven (1999) uses data on automobile sales to test the implications of his model
with regards to price markups. Ellison and Ellison (2009) test the finding from Ellison (2005) that unobserved prices
can increase profits by examining Internet retailers.
9The findings for the own-price effect in Brueckner et al. (2015) are mostly consistent with the theoretical pre-
dictions of this paper. I compare their findings to my predictions when discussing the own-price effect in the theory
section of this paper.
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To obtain more precise estimates, I interact the bag fee variables with market characteristics and
differentiate between connecting and nonstop flights. I find the reduction in fares from competitor
bag fees is greater on routes with connecting flights, flights of greater distance, and flights with a
larger proportion of business travelers. Additional evidence reveals differing effects of competitor bag
fees along the fare distribution. In particular, the impact of competitor bag fees on fares is greater
on the higher end (80th percentile) of the fare distribution relative to the lower end (20th percentile),
suggesting consumers purchasing at different parts of the distribution have differing preferences for
bag-checking services. Finally, the reduction in fares is smaller on routes flown by Southwest, which
I hypothesis is due to Southwest’s “Bags Fly Free” advertisement campaign.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the model of
competitive add-on pricing and predictions for the own-price and competitive effect of product
unbundling. Section 1.3 discusses the data and variable construction and Section 1.4 describes my
empirical strategy for identifying the competitive effect of unbundling luggage and airfares. Section
1.5 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 1.6 concludes; additional details about the
derivation of prices in the model and construction of variables are relegated to the Appendix.
1.2 Model of Competitive Add-on Pricing
The following theoretical model of competitive add-on pricing is an adaptation of a het-
erogeneous Bertrand model, allowing for both vertical and horizontal differentiation. The setup is
based on the model in Verboven (1999).10 Several new assumptions are made to aid in the identifi-
cation of the competitive effect of unbundling, particularly, the choice of add-on fees is assumed to
be exogenous to each firm’s pricing decision. I derive prices across three scenarios: i) neither firm
has an add-on fee, ii) one firm has an add-on fee while the competitor does not, and iii) both firms
have an add-on fee, which lends insight into the impact of both own and competitor add-on fees.
An alternative specification of the model, which allows for consumers to be unaware of add-on fees,
is described after discussion of the main specification. Note the model is discussed in the context of
airlines but the conclusions of the model extend to any industry with similar characteristics.
10Many of my changes to the model in Verboven (1999) were influenced by Ellison (2005), Stole (2007), and Shulman
and Geng (2013)
4
1.2.1 Model Setup
1.2.1.1 Product Variants and Pricing
Suppose there are two airline carriers, indexed by j ∈ {1, 2}, competing in a particular
market (i.e., route). Carriers are horizontally differentiated in that they are located at opposite ends
of a line (x1 = 0, x2 = 1). Each carrier offers vertically differentiated products L (base good) and
H (premium good) at prices pjL and pjH . The base good is the flight itself, while the premium
good can be thought of as a flight that includes bag-checking services (i.e., the add-on). Thus, the
flight fare is equal to pjL and the baggage fee is equal to pjH − pjL, or Fee. The choice of bag fee is
assumed to be exogenous to the carrier’s decision; thus, carriers only choose the flight fare, pjL ≡ pj ,
while the premium price is equal to the fare plus the bag fee, pjH ≡ pj + Fee.11 For both carriers,
marginal costs of the base and premium goods are cL and cH , respectively.
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1.2.1.2 Consumer Preferences
Consumers’ preferences are captured by two parameters, one capturing brand preference (x)
and one capturing taste for the add-on (θ). Each consumer is endowed with income I and wishes to
purchase at most one unit of the two product variants. Consumer i obtains the following indirect
utility for purchasing product k from carrier j:
uijk = I + vkθi − pjk − t|xj − xi|, (1.1)
where vk represents a shared valuation for product k, t represents common transportation costs for
all individuals, and both xi and θi are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1].
The consumer’s decision can be broken down into two steps. First, for each carrier, the
consumer decides between the base good (flight only) and premium good (flight with bag check).
The marginal consumer satisfies
I + vLθ
∗ − pjL − t|xj − x∗| = I + vHθ∗ − pjH − t|xj − x∗|, (1.2)
where θ∗ is the indifferent consumer’s marginal willingness to pay for quality. Recalling pjH ≡
11In reality, a carrier’s decision to use a bag fee was clearly not exogenous, and likely was done by weighing the costs
and benefits across all markets. Nonetheless, the bag fee amount is still fixed across all markets, so the assumption
that flight fares are chosen given a fixed bag fee is plausible.
12The direct marginal cost of checking a passenger’s bag is defined as cH − cL.
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pjL + Fee, the above equality simplifies to
θ∗ ≡ Fee
vH − vL . (1.3)
Therefore, consumers with θi < θ
∗ prefer the base good of carrier j (i.e., won’t check a bag with
carrier j), while consumers with θi > θ
∗ prefer the premium good of carrier j (i.e., will check a bag
with carrier j). Notice, if carrier j does not have a bag fee (Fee = 0), all consumers will check a
bag if they fly with carrier j.13
Second, the consumer compares the preferred goods of the two carriers. There will be a
variety of possible comparisons consumers make, depending on which carriers charge a bag fee and
each consumer’s θ in relation to θ∗. For example, assume carrier 2 does not have a bag fee and
carrier 1 does. In this scenario, all consumers will purchase the premium good from carrier 2 while
the good purchased from carrier 1 depends on the consumer’s θ. A consumer with θi < θ
∗ will
decide between the base good of carrier 1 and the premium good of carrier 2, whereas a consumer
with θi > θ
∗ will decide between the premium goods of both carriers.
1.2.1.3 Timing and Equilibrium
The game consists of three stages. In the first stage, bag fees for each carrier are assigned.
In the second stage, carriers choose ticket prices. In the final stage, consumers decide whether to
purchase the base or premium good and from which carrier. Since bag fees are not chosen by the
carriers, there are three sets of equilibrium prices corresponding to the following scenarios: i) neither
carrier has a bag fee, ii) one carrier has a bag fee while the other does not, and iii) both carriers
have a bag fee.
1.2.2 Prices in the Three Scenarios
1.2.2.1 Neither Carrier has a Bag Fee
Consider the above model in a scenario where neither carrier has a bag fee. All consumers
will purchase the premium good (i.e., all consumers will check a bag), and each carrier will choose
a single price, pj . The consumer’s decision is now purely based on brand choice. Therefore, the
13Without a bag fee, the prices of the base and premium goods are equal, so a consumer will always purchase the
premium good (check a bag).
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marginal consumer for the entire population satisfies
I − p1 − t|0− x∗| = I − p2 − t|1− x∗|, (1.4)
and is located at
x∗ ≡ 1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
. (1.5)
All consumers located to the left of the marginal consumer (xi < x
∗) purchase from carrier 1, while
all consumers located to the right (xi > x
∗) purchase from carrier 2. Thus, firm profits are
pi1 =(p1 − cH)
(
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
)
(1.6)
pi2 =(p2 − cH)
(
1
2
+
p1 − p2
2t
)
. (1.7)
Given these profit functions, equilibrium prices are
pnofees1 = p
nofees
2 = t+ cH , (1.8)
and therefore, the two carriers split the market.
1.2.2.2 Asymmetric Bag Fee Policies - carrier 1 has a bag fee; carrier 2 does not
Now assume carrier 1 has a bag fee while carrier 2 does not have a bag fee. Therefore,
carrier 1 now offers two variants as outlined in the model setup above, while carrier 2 still only offers
one product. Comparable to the “no bag fees” scenario, all passengers of carrier 2 will check a bag.
If θi < θ
∗ the consumer prefers the base good of carrier 1, and thus, will make a decision between
carrier 1’s base good and carrier 2’s good. For the mass of consumers with θi < θ
∗, the marginal
consumer satisfies
I + vLθ − p1 − t|0− x∗L| = I + vHθ − p2 − t|1− x∗L|, (1.9)
where the location of the marginal consumer is
x∗L ≡
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
− θ(vH − vL)
2t
. (1.10)
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For consumers with θi > θ
∗, their decision is solely based on brand choice. Thus, the marginal
consumer satisfies
I − p1 − Fee− t|0− x∗H | = I − p2 − t|1− x∗H |, (1.11)
where the location of the marginal consumer is
x∗H ≡
1
2
+
p2 − p1 − Fee
2t
. (1.12)
Given θi and xi are each uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1], the demand structure
can be depicted by the illustration in Figure 1.1. If carriers have symmetric bag fee policies (both
charging a bag fee or both not), their fares will be symmetric, and the marginal consumer will be
located at x∗ = 12 . In the asymmetric case, the location of the marginal consumer depends on θ
∗ and
the fare difference. With a bag fee, carrier 1 sells both the base and premium product variants. For
area A of Figure 1.1, consumers check a bag and carrier 1 gains a net revenue per passenger equal
to p1 + Fee− cH . Non-bag-checking passengers are located in area B, for which carrier 1 realizes a
net revenue per passenger of p1 − cL. If carrier 1 raises its price, the net revenues of both groups
increase, but some passengers switch to carrier 2, shown by shifting the kinked curve to the left.
Carrier 1’s problem is then to weigh this tradeoff to find the optimal p1. Carrier 2 faces a similar
tradeoff, except that its net revenue is the same for all passengers since they all check a bag.
The aggregate demands for each product are
q1L =
∫ θ∗
0
(
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
− θ(vH − vL)
2t
)
dθ (1.13)
q1H =
∫ 1
θ∗
(
1
2
+
p2 − p1 − Fee
2t
)
dθ (1.14)
q2H =
∫ θ∗
0
(
1
2
+
p1 − p2
2t
+
θ(vH − vL)
2t
)
dθ +
∫ 1
θ∗
(
1
2
+
p1 + Fee− p2
2t
+
)
dθ, (1.15)
where q1L corresponds to area B of Figure 1.1, q1H corresponds to area A, and q2H corresponds to
the area right of the kinked curve. Thus, firm profits are
pi1 = (p1 − cL)q1L + (p1 + Fee− cH)q1H (1.16)
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pi2 = (p2 − cH)q2H . (1.17)
Given the profit functions and aggregate demands above, and after substituting FeevH−vL for θ
∗,
equilibrium prices are
pasym1 = t+ cH − Fee+
(
5Fee− 4(cH − cL)
6(vH − vL)
)
Fee (1.18)
pasym2 = t+ cH +
(
Fee− 2(cH − cL)
6(vH − vL)
)
Fee. (1.19)
1.2.2.3 Both Carriers have a Bag Fee
Now, assume both carriers charge identical bag fees.14 The fraction of consumers who wish
to check a bag (buy the premium good) will again be determined by θ∗. If θi < θ∗ the consumer
prefers the base good from either carrier 1 or 2, whereas if θi > θ
∗ the consumer prefers the premium
good from either carrier 1 or 2. The marginal consumer for both groups of consumers (θi < θ
∗ and
θi > θ
∗) is located at
x∗ =
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
. (1.20)
Thus, firm profits are
pi1 = (p1 + Fee− cH)(1− θ∗)
(
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
)
+ (p1 − cL)θ∗
(
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
)
(1.21)
pi2 = (p2 + Fee− cH)(1− θ∗)
(
1
2
+
p1 − p2
2t
)
+ (p2 − cL)θ∗
(
1
2
+
p1 − p2
2t
)
. (1.22)
Given these profit functions and substituting FeevH−vL for θ
∗ equilibrium prices are
psym1 = p
sym
2 = t+ cH − Fee+
(
Fee− (cH − cL)
vH − vL
)
Fee, (1.23)
and the two carriers split the market.
14Assuming the fee amounts are the same simplifies the analysis, but is also a practical assumption given most
carriers have the same bag fee amount in actuality.
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1.2.3 Price Comparisons and Empirical Implications
Table 1.1 presents the prices for both carriers under the three scenarios. The effects of
own-bag-fees and competitor bag fees are discussed below, as well as the empirical implications of
my model.
1.2.3.1 Own-Price Effect of Bag Fees
Comparing prices from Table 1.1, the following conclusion on own-bag-fees can be derived:
Proposition 1. A carrier will drop its fare if it introduces a bag fee and the following holds: 6(vH−
vL) > 5Fee− 4(cH − cL).
Proof. Comparing carrier 1’s prices between the scenarios where neither carrier has a bag fee and
only carrier 1 has a bag fee lends the following difference:
pasym1 − pnofees1 = −Fee+
(
5Fee− 4(cH − cL)
6(vH − vL)
)
Fee. (1.24)
The expression in (1.24) will be negative if 6(vH − vL) > 5Fee− 4(cH − cL). Note that vH − vL is
the maximum value of bag-checking services among consumers, so the sufficient condition is likely
to be true in reality. Further, the result is not conditional on a carrier’s competitor not charging a
bag fee, as the difference psym2 − pasym2 is equivalent to (1.24). 
The result can be understood as follows. When a carrier does not have a bag fee, all of its
consumers will check a bag; thus, the carrier’s ticket price is based off of the total cost of both the
flight and bag-checking service. If the carrier introduces a bag fee, the consumers with relatively
low willingness to pay for bag-checking services will no longer check a bag. The cost savings realized
when selling to these non-bag-checking consumers leads to lower ticket prices. Consumers who
continue to check a bag must pay the bag fee, and thus, pay a higher total price than the non-
bag-checking consumers. Notice, from (1.24), that the new total price to fly and check a bag after
the introduction of a bag fee is likely to be higher than the original fare. The following corollary
highlights this possibility:
Corollary 1. A carrier’s total price (i.e., fare plus bag fee) will be higher than its original fare if it
introduces a bag fee that is greater than its cost to transport checked baggage.
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Together, Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 follow the common price discrimination story found
in previous work in the add-on pricing literature. Further, the conclusions are consistent with the
empirical findings in Brueckner et al. (2015). Their empirical results suggest carriers reduced average
fares by about 3% when an own-bag-fee is present.15 The reduction corresponds to a drop of roughly
$5 for the average fare in their sample. Since bag fees vary between $15 and $20 during the time
period of their analysis, the price bag-checking passengers pay is estimated to increase when a bag fee
is implemented. The estimate is an average effect of own-bag-fees across all routes in their sample;
however, routes will differ in parameter values, such as the consumer value of bag-checking services
and the airline’s cost of transporting checked bags. In the theoretical model, these parameters affect
the magnitude of the change in fares due to own-bag-fees as noted in the following corollary:
Corollary 2. If the following holds: 5Fee > 4(cH − cL),
(a) An increase in the value of bag-checking services (vH − vL) results in a larger decrease in a
carrier’s base-good price when an own-bag-fee is implemented.
(b) An increase in the cost of checking a bag results in a larger decrease in a carrier’s base-good
price when an own-bag-fee is implemented.
Proof. Using the expression in (1.24), the following derivative corresponds to the result in (a):
∂(pasym1 − pnofees1 )
∂(vH − vL) = −
(
5Fee− 4(cH − cL)
6(vH − vL)2
)
Fee. (1.25)
That is, as (vH−vL) increases, the decrease in price due to baggage fees increases in absolute terms.
The following derivative corresponds to the result in (b):
∂(pasym1 − pnofees1 )
∂(cH − cL) = −
2Fee
3(vH − vL) . (1.26)
Thus, a higher cost of bag-checking leads to a greater decrease in price. The same conclusions for
both (a) and (b) can be derived for carrier 2 when comparing prices across the other scenario, that
is, when carrier 2 introduces a bag fee after carrier 1 already charges one.

Intuitively, when a carrier introduces a bag fee it must weigh these two options: cut fares by
enough to maintain sales towards bag-checking consumers or reduce fares by only a small amount
15The size of the effect may seem small given the predictions of my model; however, note that my model assumes
all passengers would check a bag if it were included for free. Since this is not true in reality, the effect will actually
be much smaller.
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to earn greater net revenues from the non-bag-checking consumers. The market characteristics that
effect this pricing decision are the proportion of non-bag-checking consumers in the market and the
cost of bag-checking services.
If the market consists of mostly bag-checking consumers, the bag fee introducing carrier will
cut fares by a greater amount to maintain a decent share of the market. In contrast, if the market is
characterized by a majority of consumers who would rather not check a bag in return for a discounted
fare, the bag fee carrier only needs to slightly drop fares to gain a large portion of the market. With
the proportion of non-bag-checking consumers equal to θ∗ ≡ FeevH−vL , a higher (lower) value for
bag-checking services in the market gives a larger proportion of bag-checking (non-bag-checking)
consumers, which results in a greater (smaller) decrease in fares.
As for the cost of bag-checking services, recall the original fare (before charging a bag fee)
is based on the per passenger cost of both flying and checking a bag. Thus, when a bag fee is
introduced, and some portion of the market no longer checks a bag, the cost of bag-checking services
can be eliminated from the ticket price. The larger the cost of checking a bag, the greater the drop
in fares compared to the non-bag-fee fare, as shown in part (b) of Corollary 2. Note the proportion
of non-bag-checking consumers alters the impact of a marginal increase in the cost of bag-checking
services, as one would expect.
Brueckner et al. (2015) find evidence in support of Corollary 2(a) by differentiating between
business and leisure markets when estimating the effect of introducing a bag fee. They find markets
which consist of more leisure travelers, who place higher values on checking baggage, coincide with
a larger decrease in fares due to the introduction of own-bag-fees.16 Further, they find fares in the
lower end of the fare distribution (25th percentile), which are more representative of leisure travelers,
drop by more than higher fares.
The evidence presented in Brueckner et al. (2015) does not lend confirmation of Corollary 2
(b). Using distance as a proxy for the cost of bag-checking services, they find longer routes (i.e., more
costly bag-checking services) are correlated with lower percentage reductions in fares due to own bag
fees. They reason the longer a route is the lower percentage of cost corresponding to bag-checking
services, as the cost of the flight itself increases at a faster rate; thus, the effect of bag fees should
16Brueckner et al. (2015) use the absolute difference between the average January high temperatures at the endpoint
cites of a market as a proxy for the proportion of leisure travelers. A higher difference in temperature corresponds to
a market more likely to have a higher proportion of leisure travelers or vacationers. Leisure travelers are assumed to
have higher values for bag check services.
12
be smaller. Nonetheless, their findings do not disprove Corollary 2, which suggests a relationship
between costs and the effect of own bag fees in levels and not percentages.
1.2.3.2 Competitive Effect of Bag Fees
Comparing prices between the three scenarios, the following result on competitor bag fees
can be derived:
Proposition 2. A carrier, regardless of whether it has an own-bag-fee, will drop its fare if its
competitor introduces a bag fee and FeecH−cL < 2. If instead,
Fee
cH−cL > 2, a carrier will respond to its
competitor unbundling by increasing its fare.
Proof. The following difference highlights the change in fares when a competitor introduces a bag
fee:
pasym2 − pnofees2 =
(
Fee− 2(cH − cL)
6(vH − vL)
)
Fee, (1.27)
where the difference psym1 −pasym1 lends an equivalent result. The expression in (1.27) will be negative
if FeecH−cL < 2 and positive if
Fee
cH−cL > 2; thus, confirming Proposition 2. 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 can be understood as follows. Once carrier 1 introduces
a bag fee, carrier 2 competes with a lower flight fare and higher total price (flight plus bag check)
than before. This differential gives opposing incentives to carrier 2: on the one hand, carrier 2 may
be better off reducing its fare to compete for the non-bag-checking consumers; but on the other
hand, carrier 2 could raise its fare to gain higher net revenues from bag-checking consumers. The
difference between the cost of bag-checking services and the bag fee are the main determinants of
carrier 1’s new prices, which in turn, affects the payoffs in carrier 2’s trade-off.
If the cost of bag-checking services is high relative to the bag fee ( FeecH−cL < 2), carrier 1
gains a significant cost advantage by discouraging consumers from checking a bag, and will act by
dropping its ticket price by a large amount (as noted in Corollary 2). In this case, carrier 2 is
better off reducing its fare because not doing so will result in a large portion of non-bag-checking
consumers to switch to carrier 1. Further, carrier 2 has little to gain from raising its fare and focusing
on bag-checking consumers since carrier 1’s markup on bag-checking consumers is relatively small.
Alternatively, if the cost of bag-checking services is relatively small compared to the bag fee
( FeecH−cL > 2), carrier 2 will actually respond to carrier 1’s bag fee introduction by raising its ticket
price. In this case, carrier 1 lowers its ticket price by a relatively small amount and its resulting total
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price will be much larger than before (a relatively high markup on bag-checking consumers). This
allows carrier 2 to raise fares without losing a substantial number of non-bag-checking consumers,
and with the increase, earn higher net revenues from a large portion of the bag-checking consumers.
The above intuition is supported by the following corollary:
Corollary 3.
(a) If FeecH−cL < 2, an increase in the cost of checking a bag (cH − cL) results in a larger decrease
in a carrier’s ticket price when a competitor introduces a bag fee.
(b) If FeecH−cL > 2, an increase in the cost of checking a bag results in a smaller increase in a
carrier’s ticket price when a competitor introduces a bag fee.
Proof. Using (1.27), the following derivative shows the effect of increasing the cost of bag-checking
services:
∂(pasym2 − pnofees2 )
∂(cH − cL) = −
(
1
3(vH − vL)
)
Fee. (1.28)
Thus, a higher cost of providing bag-checking services will result in lower ticket prices when a
competitor introduces a bag fee. The same conclusion can be derived if the prices of a bag fee
carrier are compared (psym1 − pasym1 ). 
A higher cost of bag-checking services leads the unbundling carrier to drop its ticket price
by a larger amount (from Corollary 2(b)). In response to the much lower fare and smaller markup
on bag-checking consumers, the competitor has a greater incentive to cut fares.
Similar to the own-price effect, the impact of bag fees on a competitor’s fares depends on
the proportion of non-bag-checking consumers (θ∗ = FeevH−vL ). The impact of the proportion of non-
bag-checking consumers is shown in the following corollary through a change in the value of checking
a bag (vH − vL):
Corollary 4.
(a) If FeecH−cL < 2, an increase in the value of bag-checking services (vH − vL) results in a smaller
decrease in a carrier’s ticket price when a competitor introduces a bag fee.
(b) If FeecH−cL > 2, an increase in the value of bag-checking services results in a smaller increase in
a carrier’s ticket price when a competitor introduces a bag fee.
Proof. The following derivative corresponds to the result in (a):
∂(pasym2 − pnofees2 )
∂(vH − vL) =
(
2(cH − cL)− Fee
6(vH − vL)2
)
Fee. (1.29)
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Thus, as the value of checking a bag increases, the impact of competitor bag fees (whether leading
to an increase or decrease in ticket price) decreases in magnitude. The same result is found when
comparing prices for a bag fee carrier (psym1 − pasym1 ). 
The result in Corollary 4 can be understood as follows. As the share of consumers who
wish to check a bag increases (i.e., value of bag-checking services increases), the unbundling carrier
has a greater incentive to offset the bag fee with a comparable drop in its ticket price resulting in a
negligible change in its competitor’s ticket price.17 As the number of non-bag-checking consumers
increases, the bag fee allows the unbundling carrier to successfully discriminate among consumers
leading to a larger impact on its competitor’s prices. In other words, the proportion of non-bag-
checking consumers influences the magnitude of the competitive effect of introducing a bag fee,
regardless of whether the impact is positive or negative.
1.2.4 Including Unaware Consumers in the Model
A large portion of the literature on add-on pricing assumes consumers are to some extent
unaware of add-on fees.18 Unaware consumers, often denoted as boundedly rational consumers,
change the incentives of the unbundling firm. When consumers are unaware of add-on fees, the
unbundling firm only needs to slightly decrease its base-good price in order to attract a large share
of the market. Since boundedly rational consumers only compare base-good prices, a competing
firm has more pressure to match the price drop by the unbundling firm.
To incorporate unaware consumers into the model, I follow Shulman and Geng (2013) in
allowing for a fraction of consumers to be unaware of bag fees.19 Let α represent the fraction of
consumers who are boundedly rational. These boundedly rational consumers will only compare ticket
prices between carriers (ignoring any bag fees) but will always check a bag. All other consumers (i.e.,
knowledgeable consumers) have a decision-making process as described in the main specification of
17For example, suppose all consumers continue to check a bag even when charged a bag fee. When introducing a
bag fee, a carrier has an overwhelming incentive to offset the bag fee with a equally sized drop in ticket price. Given
all consumers will check a bag and the offsetting drop in ticket price by the bag fee introducing carrier, the competing
carrier has zero to gain from a change in its ticket price. Thus, in this extreme case, the introduction of a bag fee by
a carrier will not result in a price change by its competitor.
18Some relevant examples: Verboven (1999) assumes consumers only have an expectation of the add-on fee as
opposed to knowing the exact amount. Ellison (2005) introduces a model of competitive add-on pricing when add-on
fees are naturally unobserved. Shulman and Geng (2013) includes both knowledgeable consumers and consumers who
are unaware of add-on fees in their model of add-on pricing.
19Shulman and Geng (2013) include a third consumer type, denoted base consumers, which encompasses consumers
who never purchase the add-on (i.e., never check a bag). I do not include this type of consumer in my analysis, as it
does not alter the conclusions.
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the model above (Section 1.2.1.2).
Using the same approach as before, I derive equilibrium prices under the three scenarios.
Derivation of the prices is presented in the Appendix. The key changes to the implications of the
model due to unaware consumers are discussed below.
1.2.4.1 Own-Price Effect of Bag Fees with Unaware Consumers
While the own-price effect of introducing a bag fee is the same as before (ticket price falls),
the new ticket price is now higher when some consumers are unaware of bag fees:
Proposition 3. A bag fee charging carrier’s ticket price will be higher when at least a fraction of
consumers are unaware of bag fees and the following holds: 2(vH − vL) > 5Fee− 4(cH − cL).
Proof. Comparing carrier 1’s ticket prices in the asymmetric scenario between the two specifications
lends the following difference:
(pasym1 )
unaware − pasym1 =
αFee
3
− α
(
5Fee− 4(cH − cL)
6(vH − vL)
)
Fee, (1.30)
where (pasym1 )
unaware is carrier 1’s ticket price with a bag fee when boundedly rational consumers
are present and pasym1 is carrier 1’s ticket price with a bag fee when all consumers are aware of bag
fees. The expression in (1.30) is greater than zero if 2(vH − vL) > 5Fee− 4(cH − cL). Since vH − vL
is the maximum value of bag-checking services among consumers, the sufficient condition should
hold true in reality. 
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is carrier 1 has an incentive to cut fares by a small
amount when it introduces a bag fee because unaware consumers do not take into account bag fees
when choosing between carriers. Thus, unaware consumers will switch to carrier 1 because of the
lower price, even though in actuality they will pay a higher effective price. Not only will carrier 1
attract more consumers by having a slightly lower fare, but it will also realize relatively large net
revenues, as unaware consumers are charged a bag fee. The possibility of gaining higher net revenues
from the unaware consumers leads to a higher ticket price compared to when there are no unaware
consumers.
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1.2.4.2 Competitive Effect of Bag Fees with Unaware Consumers
The inclusion of unaware consumers and the coinciding changes to a bag fee carrier’s prices
gives new conditions for the competitive effect of product unbundling:
Proposition 4. A carrier, regardless of whether it has an own-bag-fee, will drop its fare if its
competitor introduces a bag fee and 2α(vH−vL) > (1−α)(Fee−2(cH−cL)). If instead, 2α(vH−vL) <
(1−α)(Fee− 2(cH − cL)), a carrier will respond to its competitor unbundling by increasing its fare.
Proof. The following difference highlights the change in fares when a competitor introduces a bag
fee and a fraction α of consumers are unaware of bag fees:
pasym2 − pnofees2 = −
αFee
3
+ (1− α)
(
Fee− 2(cH − cL)
6(vH − vL)
)
Fee, (1.31)
where the difference psym1 −pasym1 lends an equivalent result. The expression in (1.31) will be negative
if 2α(vH−vL) > (1−α)(Fee−2(cH−cL)) and positive if 2α(vH−vL) < (1−α)(Fee−2(cH−cL)). 
The result in Proposition 4 can be understood as follows. Since boundedly rational con-
sumers only compare ticket prices between carriers (ignoring bag fees), the drop in ticket price by
the bag fee introducing carrier gives even more downward pressure on its competitor’s ticket price
compared to when all consumers are aware of bag fees. Thus, a carrier’s introduction of a bag fee is
more likely to lead to lower fares by its competitor when the market contains unaware consumers.
The impact of unaware consumers is clear when comparing the sufficient conditions between Propo-
sition 4 and the parallel proposition when all consumers are aware of bag fees, Proposition 2. The
sufficient condition for a negative competitive effect of bag fees is more easily satisfied in Proposition
4 because of the inclusion of unaware consumers.
Using (1.31), the following conclusion on marginally increasing the proportion of boundedly
rational consumers can be found:
Corollary 5. Suppose that 2(vH − vL) > 2(cH − cL)− Fee.
(a) If 2α(vH − vL) > (1 − α)(Fee − 2(cH − cL)), the higher the fraction of consumers who are
unaware of bag fees, the larger the reduction in a carrier’s fare due to competitor bag fees.
(b) If 2α(vH − vL) < (1 − α)(Fee − 2(cH − cL)), the higher the fraction of consumers who are
unaware of bag fees, the smaller the increase in a carrier’s fare due to competitor bag fees.
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Proof. The following derivative corresponds to the result in Corollary 5:
∂(pasym2 − pnofees2 )
∂α
= −Fee
3
−
(
Fee− 2(cH − cL)
6(vH − vL)
)
Fee. (1.32)

Corollary 5 gives additional support to the intuition behind Proposition 4. The reduction
in fares by a carrier in response to a competitor introducing a bag fee and reducing fares will be
greater as the number of unaware consumers increases in a market. If a carrier does not respond to
its competitor’s lower fares from a bag fee introduction, the carrier will lose a large portion of the
unaware consumers who do not account for bag fees when choosing between airlines.
Related to Corollary 5 is product advertisement, which plays a vital role in the airline
industry. Although advertising is not included in the present model, Gabaix and Laibson (2006)
use a comparable model of competitive add-on pricing but allow firms to choose whether or not to
advertise add-on fees. The ability to advertise fees (or not) gives firms the ability to influence the
proportion of boundedly rational consumers. An advertisement campaign focused on bag fees, like
Southwest’s “Bags Fly Free” campaign, will educate consumers about bag fees, thus reducing the
proportion of unaware consumers. In the empirics of this paper I examine the impact of unaware
consumers by exploiting Southwest’s unique advertisement campaign.
1.3 Description of Data and Variables
The main data source for this study is the Airline Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B),
published by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). The DB1B dataset is a 10-percent
random sample of all domestic tickets issued by U.S. reporting airlines. These data provide informa-
tion on flight fares, itinerary (including origin, destination, and connecting airports), airline carrier,
and the number of passengers who fly an itinerary at a given fare. The data are quarterly, with my
dataset spanning from 2007:Q1 - 2010:Q4.
Observations in the raw DB1B data are coupons or segments for itineraries at given fares.
For example, a one-way flight from Atlanta to Chicago that has a connecting flight in Charlotte
would have two coupons (observations), one for ATL - CLT and the other for CLT - ORD. I collapse
the data into observations at the year-quarter-market-carrier level, where a market is defined as
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two end-point airports20 and carrier is the ticket holding carrier.21 A single observation in my
final dataset includes the ticketing carrier, number of passengers, and average fare for a market in
a specific year and quarter.22 The panel dataset covers 7,253 unique markets, accounting for 126
million passengers.23 The sample includes legacy carriers American, United, Delta, Continental, US
Airways, Alaska, and Midwest, as well as low-cost carriers Southwest, JetBlue, AirTran, Frontier,
Spirit, Allegiant, Sun Country, and Virgin America.24
The primary dependent variable of my analysis, Fare, is the passenger weighted average fare
calculated at the carrier-market-time level. Since Fare conceals the variation of a carrier’s fares on
any given market, before collapsing the raw data, fare percentiles are calculated. Table 1.2 presents
summary statistics for Fare and a select few of these fare percentiles. Looking at the passenger
weighted statistics, the average fare for a passenger in my sample is $189.88, while the average 20th
and 80th percentile fares are $133.35 and $283.48, respectively. These percentile fares are used to
analyze how the bag fee effects vary across different parts of the fare distribution.
It is important to recognize the price variable in the data only represents the flight fare paid
by individuals.25 The data do not have information on whether passengers checked a bag, and thus,
my empirical analysis is limited to measuring the effects on the ticket price (base-good price). I can
make some statements about the potential total price (ticket price plus bag fee), but I won’t be able
to infer anything more without data on checked baggage.26
20Directionality is suppressed, so a flight from Chicago to Atlanta and a flight from Atlanta to Chicago are defined as
the same market. There is little variation in ticket prices between directions, especially since roundtrip itineraries are
split into two observations and the fare is divided by two. Further, most of the other variables used in my analysis are
the same for either direction. Nonetheless, I tested my analysis on the sample where directionality is not suppressed,
but found results to be similar.
21The carrier of a flight is defined by the ticket holding carrier as opposed to the operating carrier to identify feeder
carriers with their mainline partner. Flights which include a switch in the ticket holding carrier are dropped.
22I apply several common filters used in the airline economics literature to construct a comparable dataset. Ob-
servations are dropped if creditability is in doubt (when the variable dollarcred in the raw data is equal to zero),
the itinerary fare is greater than five times the Standard Industry Fare Level (SIFL), the directional fare is below
$25 (roundtrip flights are split into two observations and the fare is divided by two), or the itinerary is open jaw
(roundtrip passenger who doesn’t return to the starting airport). Furthermore, I drop one-way itineraries with more
than one directional break (travel break other than a plane change), and I drop roundtrip itineraries with more than
two directional breaks. My data include both nonstop and connecting service, however, to eliminate odd flights,
itineraries with more than three segments in a direction are dropped. Finally, only travel within the lower 48 states
is included in my sample.
23On average, each quarter has 6,276 unique markets.
24Northwest observations are dropped from the sample to avoid any bias pertaining to the Delta/Northwest merger,
which occurred from 2008-2010. However, competition variables do still take into account competition from Northwest.
Several other mergers began to develop in my sample period (United/Continental and Southwest/AirTran), however
the process of these mergers started in late 2010 and were not completed until after the end of my sample period
(2012 and 2014, respectively). Thus, observations for these carriers were kept in the final dataset.
25In other words, the data do not include information on additional fees such as bag fees, food, in-flight entertain-
ment, or seat upgrades.
26Therefore, I cannot say anything about the average total price paid by passengers since I have no way of knowing
whether or not they paid to check a bag.
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To estimate the effect bag fees have on fares, several bag fee variables are constructed to
account for both own-bag-fees and competitor bag fees. My analysis also includes a comprehensive
set of competition variables and market control variables. The remainder of this section discusses
these variables in more detail.
1.3.1 Bag Fee Variables
Beginning in 2007, carriers began to implement fees for the first checked bag on travel within
the U.S.27 Spirit and Allegiant were the first to charge first bag fees in June and October of 2007
respectively. By the end of 2008, United, American, US Airways, Delta, Northwest, Continental,
Midwest, Sun Country, Frontier, and AirTran all had implemented a first bag fee. Virgin America
and Alaska introduced a first bag fee in 2009, leaving Southwest and JetBlue as the only carriers in
the sample to not introduce a first bag fee. See Table 1.3 for a full list of bag fee introduction dates
by fee amount. All of the bag fee carriers (and JetBlue) implemented a second bag fee earlier in the
sample (most in 2007); however, because very few passengers check a second bag, the effect of these
fees is not included in the analysis.
To examine the effect of first bag fees, I create an indicator, denoted as Bag Fee, that equals
1 if a carrier has a bag fee in the time period and 0 otherwise.28 Brueckner et al. (2015) use the
same variable to estimate the effect of own-bag-fees on own-prices. Since the focus of my paper is on
the competitive effects of bag fees, I construct additional bag fee variables to account for competitor
bag fees. Comp Bag Fee is an indicator for whether a carrier’s competition in the market has a bag
fee. Comp Bag Fee equals 1 if at least one competitor in the market has a bag fee, and equals 0
otherwise.29 A carrier is counted as a competitor if it serves at least 10 percent of the market in
the given time period. An alternative measure of competitor bag fees is Pct Comp Bag Fee which
measures the percent of competitor passengers in the market who are subject to bag fees.30 Pct
Comp Bag Fee features added variation not picked up in Comp Bag Fee, and lends additional insight
27Before 2007, the first checked bag was free with the purchase of the flight for all carriers in this sample, not
counting additional fees contributed to oversize, weight, etc.
28Since the data are quarterly, if a carrier introduces a bag fee in the middle of the quarter, Bag Fee equals a
fraction according to the amount of days left in the quarter.
29Similar to Bag Fee, if a competitor begins to use a bag fee in the middle of a quarter, Comp Bag Fee equals a
fraction as opposed to 1. Further, Comp Bag Fee is always equal to the maximum Bag Fee out of the competitors
in the market at that time period. For example, if one competitor has a bag fee for only half of the quarter while
another competitor has a bag fee for the entire quarter, Comp Bag Fee records a 1 for that entry.
30In saying “subject to bag fees” I am only implying these passengers are flying on a carrier who currently enforces
a bag fee. The data do not contain details on whether individuals would have to pay the fee if they check a bag, such
as a seat class perk that includes a free bag check.
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into the effect of competitor bag fees in relation to their significance in a market.
Table 1.2 presents summary statistics for the bag fee variables. These statistic imply about
39% of passengers fly on a carrier with a bag fee over the entire sample. Similarly, about 39% of
passengers fly on a carrier that is facing a competitor with a bag fee, while on average, 35% of
competitor passengers are subject to bag fees. These percentages increase when earlier observations
are dropped, particularly those in 2007 and early 2008, when a majority of carriers did not charge
bag fees. By the end of 2009, about 70% of total passengers fly on a bag fee charging carrier.
1.3.2 Market Characteristics Variables
The theory predicts market characteristics, such as the value of bag-checking services and
costs of transporting baggage, influence the impact bag fees have on ticket prices. I construct
several variables to control for these market characteristics. As a proxy for the value of bag-checking
services in a market, I calculate the ratio of accommodation earnings to total nonfarm earnings
for the surrounding local area of each endpoint city.31 I record the highest value between the two
endpoint cities of a route as its earnings ratio for the market. Variations of earnings ratio have
been used in previous studies, most notably Borenstein (1989), Borenstein and Rose (1994), and
Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), to measure the degree to which a market should be considered a leisure
(vacation) route. Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), in particular, find convincing evidence that a higher
earnings ratio corresponds to a greater proportion of leisure to business travelers.32 Since leisure
travelers (i.e., vacationers) are more likely to have higher values for bag-checking services than
business travelers, a higher earnings ratio is correlated with a higher value for bag-checking services
in the market.33
There are two observable market characteristics that influence the cost of transporting
baggage: the distance of the flight and whether the flight has connections. The variable distance
31Data on local industry specific earnings were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (table CA5, Personal
Income by Major Component and Earnings by Industry)
32Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) find evidence that supports earnings ratio as a proxy for measuring leisure markets, as
routes with a higher earnings ratio (i.e., more likely a leisure route) coincide with less price dispersion. In particular,
Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) were examining price dispersion across routes, where the dispersion in a route is largely
a product of differences between leisure and business travelers. Leisure routes mostly consist of vacationers, whereas
other routes, particularly big city routes, consist of both leisure and business travelers. These big city routes are
shown to have greater price dispersion, as business travelers are charged higher fares.
33Even though there is no conclusive data on which passengers check bags, it is common knowledge in the in-
dustry that business travelers generally avoid checking bags, even before bag fees were implemented. For example,
business travelers want to get out of the airport as quickly as possible, and thus, don’t want to wait for their
bag to arrive at the baggage claim. This is discussed in an interview with the CEO of farecompare.com on NPR.
http://www.npr.org/2015/07/01/419218276/the-economics-of-airline-baggage-check-to-pay-or-not-to-pay
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records the average distance between two endpoint cities at each time-market-carrier observation.34
Longer flights correspond to greater costs of transporting baggage due to higher fuel costs. The
variable connect is an indicator for whether the fare is for a connecting service as opposed to
nonstop.35 A significant portion of the costs of transporting baggage is attributed to baggage
handling costs, particularly moving luggage from one plane to another; thus, flights with a connection
will have substantially higher costs of transporting baggage compared to a nonstop flight.
Additional variables are constructed to control for variation in income and populations
across markets. The variables income and population are the geometric means of the endpoint city
incomes and populations, respectively.36 These variables are included as controls in my analysis,
since the surrounding income and population of a market will have an effect on demand. Table 1.2
presents summary statistics of these variables, as well as the other market variables, for both the
non-weighted and weighted sample.
1.3.3 Competition Variables
I construct a similar set of competition variables to those in Brueckner et al. (2015) to
control for the effect of various types of competition.37 These competition variables differentiate
between nonstop and connecting service, as well as competition from legacy carriers, low-cost car-
riers (LCCs), and Southwest.38 Additional competition variables account for potential competition
and competition from adjacent airports. The construction of these variables is presented in the
Appendix.39
34Flight distance will slightly vary for the same route, especially if there is a connection. Therefore, distance is
calculated as a passenger weighted average.
35The raw data are actually collapsed to the time-market-carrier-product level, where product is either connecting
or nonstop service. So, if a carrier offers both connecting and nonstop flights for a market, the carrier will have two
separate observations corresponding to that market and time period. Nonetheless, it is more common for a carrier to
offer one or the other as opposed to both connecting and nonstop service.
36Data on local area income and population were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (table CA1,
Personal Income, Population, Per Capita Personal Income.)
37Unlike Brueckner et al. (2015), I do not split the sample into nonstop and connecting markets, but instead do the
analysis on the full sample.
38Most of the existing literature simply uses market Herfindahl indexes to measure competition. Morrison (2001)
and Brueckner et al. (2013) contributed to the literature by using these large sets of competition variables. Brueckner
et al. (2015) uses this comprehensive approach as well.
39See Brueckner et al. (2013) for a more detailed examination of the impacts these various types of competition
have on ticket prices.
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1.4 Empirical Strategy
1.4.1 Estimating the effect of competitor bag fees
The empirical work of this paper aims to examine the conclusions from the theory on the
competitive effect of product unbundling. While the predictions are conditional, some anecdotal
evidence on costs suggest competitor bag fees will lead to lower ticket prices. In 2008, The Wall
Street Journal estimated the cost of carry checked luggage to be roughly $15 a bag after consult-
ing numerous industry executives.40 Their calculation, which takes into account fuel, labor, and
equipment costs for the average three-hour flight, is actually missing an important component of
the costs: opportunity costs of cargo space. As of January 2015, private freight costs about a dollar
per pound, which is revenue a carrier cannot collect if a passenger’s bag is taking up space.41 With
bag fees ranging from $15-$25, the inequality from Proposition 2, FeecH−cL < 2, is likely to be true for
most markets, leading to a negative competitive effect on ticket prices. Therefore, I predict carriers
will respond to competitor bag fees by cutting ticket prices on the majority of routes.
To test this hypothesis, I estimate the effect of competitor bag fees with the following
regression:
ln
(
Fareijt
)
= α+Xijtβ1 + Zjtβ2 + β3CompBagFeeijt (1.33)
+β4(BagFeeit × CompBagFeeijt) + γit + ωj + ijt,
where Fareijt is the average fare for carrier i in market j at time t, Xijt is a vector of competition
controls, Zjt is a vector of market controls, CompBagFeeijt is an indicator for whether carrier i faces
a competitor with a bag fee in market j at time t, and BagFeeit is an indicator for whether carrier i
has a bag fee at time t. Carrier-time fixed effects (γit) and market fixed effects (ωj) are included.
42
The carrier-time fixed effects eliminate the need for an independent indicator for whether a carrier
has an own-bag-fee. The coefficients of interest are those measuring the impact of competitor bag
fees on non-bag-fee carriers (β3) and bag fee carriers (β4). An alternative approach is to replace
CompBagFee with PctCompBagFee to allow for more variation in the measure for competitor bag
40“What It Costs An Airline to Fly Your Luggage” by Scott McCartney, WSJ, November 2008.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122757025502954613
41This is according to a New York City seafood restaurant in an interview on NPR.
http://www.npr.org/2015/01/21/378905601/tired-of-paying-for-checked-baggage-youre-actually-getting-a-good-deal
42Including market fixed effects will weaken the coefficients for some of the market variables, but this is not an issue
given the focus is on the bag fee variables.
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fees. I use this specification to complement my main regression in (1.33).
The above specification is limited because the estimates only infer an average effect of
competitor bag fees on fares across all markets. To obtain more precise estimates, and empirically
test Corollaries 3 and 4, I interact CompBagFee and BagFee×CompBagFee with relevant market
controls. For one specification, I interact the competitor bag fee variables with my proxy for the
average value of bag-checking services in a market, earnings ratio (Corollary 4). A relatively high
earnings ratio corresponds to a vacation route for which a large portion of consumers are leisure
travelers resulting in a higher value for bag-checking services. In contrast, a low earnings ratio
represents a market consisting of a greater mix between leisure and business travelers, for which the
average value of bag check services is lower. In a separate regression, I interact the competitor bag
fee variables with distance, allowing the effect to vary between shorter and longer routes. Longer
routes encompass greater costs of transporting checked luggage, such as fuel and opportunity cost
of freight, and thus, by allowing me to identify how costs of bag-checking services alters the effect
of competitor bag fees (Corollary 3).
Baggage handling costs are also a component of the overall cost of bag-checking services.
A contributing factor to the size of handling costs is whether or not there are connections. In
particular, baggage handling costs are greater on connecting flights given the additional times luggage
is transfered between planes. To further test the implications of higher costs of bag-checking services
(Corollary 3), I estimate the effect of bag fees while differentiating between nonstop and connecting
competitors with bag fees. I expect connecting competition with bag fees to correspond to a greater
reduction in fares since bag fee carriers realize greater cost savings when deterring consumers from
checking a bag. Recall the competitive effect of bag fees is actually a response to price changes by the
unbundling carrier; thus, the type of service the competitor offers is the important factor to take into
account when examining the difference between nonstop and connecting service, as opposed to the
type of service offered by the carrier in question (i.e., the carrier corresponding to the observation.).
In addition to variation across markets, a unique pricing strategy in the airline industry is
for carriers to discriminate between leisure and business travelers by varying fares according to time
of purchase.43 In particular, leisure travelers represent relatively elastic demanders, who purchase
tickets well in advance of their flight’s date, while business travelers correspond to relatively inelastic
43Other discrimination tools aimed at separating business and leisure travelers are nonrefundable tickets and Sat-
urday night stay-overs.
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demanders, who purchase tickets closer to their travel dates. Following the same reasoning, I expect
there to be variation in the effect of competitor bag fees depending on which type of consumer the
fares are targeting.
Even though the data do not include information on the time of purchase, I can address
the variation in consumer type by analyzing parts of the fare distribution.44 Price dispersion within
routes has been widely studied in the airline literature.45 The consensus is that lower fares are more
representative of leisure travelers while higher fares coincide with business travelers. I exploit this
distinction along the fare distribution by replacing my original dependent variable with various fare
percentiles. Specifically, I estimate the regression in (1.33) using the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentile
fares (calculated at the carrier-market level) as the dependent variable, where the 20th and 80th
percentiles correspond to leisure and business fares respectively. Recognizing these fare percentiles
as independent markets, the effect of competitor bag fees will be greater (in absolute terms) for the
80th percentile compared to the 20th percentile, given the 20th percentile represents consumers with
relatively higher values for bag-checking services (Corollary 4).
As a final empirical test of the theory, I examine the relationship between boundedly rational
consumers and the effect of competitor bag fees (Corollary 5). Although there is no exact measure
of the number of boundedly rational consumers, in practice, the proportion of unaware consumers is
largely influenced by advertisements. The most prominent advertisement campaign is Southwest’s
“Bags Fly Free” campaign, which educates consumers about bag fees employed by Southwest’s
competitors. I test the implications of boundedly rational consumers by estimating the impact of
Southwest’s presence in a market. I interact the bag fee variables with an indicator for whether
Southwest is competing in the market; thus, estimating different bag fee effects for non-Southwest
and Southwest markets. I predict that ticket prices in Southwest markets will be less affected by
competitor bag fees because consumers as a whole are more aware of bag fees.
1.4.2 Identification
The empirical analysis of this paper aims to identify the effect competitor bag fees have
on ticket prices; thus, it is important for the bag fee variables to only describe the impact of bag
44The data do not have reliable indicators for which seat class is purchased (first class, business, coach, etc.) or
information on possible ticket restrictions, such as nonrefundable tickets. So, the only way to separate business and
leisure travelers in my data is to use the reasoning described below.
45The most noteworthy papers are Borenstein and Rose (1994) and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009).
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fees rather than other unobservable features of the carriers. A possible issue stems from the fact
that the majority of carriers (particularly legacy carriers) introduced bag fees in a short time span
(2008:Q3-2008:Q4), so unobserved changes in the industry between 2007-2008 and 2009-2010 could
be incorrectly picked up in the estimation of bag fee effects. Further, the one time switch for a
carrier to have no bag fees to charging a bag fee across all routes leaves variation only in the timing
of bag fee implementation. Given the invariability of bag fees for a carrier, the estimated impact
of own-bag-fees in Brueckner et al. (2015) could be identifying differences between legacy carriers’
fares in 2008 and their fares in 2009 that are not caused by bag fees. Figure 1.2 shows the switch
to bag fees is disproportionately represented by legacy carriers, most of which introduced bag fees
before 2009.
Unlike own-bag-fees, the competitor bag fees a carrier faces do vary across markets. The
variation, illustrated in Figure 1.3, alleviates some of the identification issues present in the estima-
tion of own-bag-fee effects. It is because of the market variation in competitor bag fees, and the lack
thereof in own bag fees, that I include carrier-time fixed effects to focus estimation on the impact
of competitor bag fees. However, the estimates of the competitor bag fee variables could still suffer
from other sources of endogeneity bias, as discussed below.
The empirical approach assumes the choice to introduce a bag fee is exogenous to the carrier’s
route-specific pricing decision. If the ticket price of a market influenced a carrier’s decision to charge
a bag fee my estimates would be biased. However, a carrier’s decision to introduce a bag fee most
likely involved a large cost-benefit analysis encompassing all of the markets served. Therefore, the
decision to charge a bag fee is based on overall network considerations, and any particular market
would not be the lone deciding factor for the implementation of bag fees. This point, along with the
controls for competition (which encompasses market entry) and carrier-time fixed effects, alleviates
most of the concern that the competition with bag fees indicators are correlated with the error
term.46
Finally, the competitive effect on non-bag-fee carriers (coefficient on Comp Bag Fee) may
46Related to this is the concern that the choice of entry in a market leads to endogeneity bias in the estimates
of the competition effects. It is common in the airline literature, particularly when a market Herfindahl index is
used to measure competition, to use instrumental variables to address endogeneity concerns. Instrumental variables
estimation in my analysis, which uses a comprehensive set of competition variables as opposed to a market Herfindahl
index, would require a large set of instrument variables, making it a difficult prospect. Even so, as pointed out in
Brueckner et al. (2013), there are two main reasons the concern of endogeneity bias can be ignored. For one, Gayle
and Wu (2013) show that endogeneity is not an issue when variables account for entry in a market, as the variables of
this paper do. Second, if the results did suffer from endogeneity the competition estimates would be biased upward,
towards zero, as higher ticket prices would attract carriers to enter a market. Since I find large, negative competition
effects, I am less concerned about endogeneity bias.
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be describing a unique strategy by Southwest since it is the largest non-bag-fee carrier. Southwest
accounts for roughly 50% of observations when a carrier faces competitor bag fees (Comp Bag Fee
= 1) and does not charge its own bag fee (Bag Fee = 0). The overwhelming number of Southwest
observations will lead to a “Southwest bias” when estimating the coefficient on Comp Bag Fee, where
Southwest’s response to competitor bag fees will dominate the result. To test for the Southwest bias
on Comp Bag Fee I run similar regressions to those above but drop all Southwest observations.
These robustness tests are discussed after the main results.
1.4.3 Weighted vs. Unweighted Regressions
Recently, the airline literature has moved to the use of weighted regressions, where passenger
counts are used to weight the observations. There are two main reasons to use weights in this
setting. One is to account for heteroskedasticity. The average fare values are calculated by passenger
weighting the fares in the raw data, thus creating a relationship between the error variance and
passenger count. The second reason is by using weights, each individual ticket equally contributes
to the estimation. Without weights, each route is given equal weight in the estimation, and thus,
the estimates are derived from route-level average fares. If passenger weights are used, the estimates
are derived from the price of each ticket, so that observations with more passengers have a greater
influence over the results. Even with these points, it is not clear whether weights improve the
analysis in this paper. The effect of bag fees depends on market characteristics and weights are
likely to limit the variation in markets, as big city tickets for legacy carriers will dominate the
regression estimation. In contrast, the unweighted regressions will lend comparisons between both
small and large markets, which could produce distinct results from the weighted regressions. For
these reasons, I include both weighted and unweighted results throughout my analysis.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Average effect of competitor bag fees
Table 1.4 presents results for the basic specification in equation (1.33). The regressions in
columns 1 and 2 use an indicator to measure competition with bag fees, while the regressions in
columns 3 and 4 use the percentage of competitors’ passengers facing bag fees as the measure for
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competition with bag fees. Regressions in columns 2 and 4 are weighted by passengers. Coefficient
estimates for the long list of competition and market control variables are reported in the Appendix.
The results in Table 1.4 indicate carriers will reduce their fares when a competitor imple-
ments a bag fee. The unweighted results in column 1 suggest a non-bag-fee carrier’s average fare
will be 1.12 percent lower in a market with at least one competitor with a bag fee compared to
the same carrier’s average fare in a market where no competitors have a bag fee. The impact is
stronger on bag fee carriers in the unweighted results, as the presence of a competitor with bag fees
corresponds to a drop in average fares of 3.52 percent. The weighted regression gives similar results,
with an average drop in fares of 1.93 percent when at least one competitor has a bag fee (regardless
of whether a carrier has an own bag fee).
These percentage impacts can be translated into dollar amounts, where JetBlue and South-
west are the more relevant carriers for the impacts on non-bag-fee carriers, and the remaining carriers
are relevant for the bag fee carrier calculations. The impact on non-bag-fee carriers is equivalent
to a $2.38 drop in the average JetBlue and Southwest fare in the unweighted sample ($212.41).
The impact on bag fee carriers translates to a drop of $8.71 in the average fare of all other carriers
($247.32). As for the weighted sample, with an average fare of $189.88 for all carriers, the reduction
in fares is roughly $3.66.
Although the theoretical model does not directly predict the difference between bag fee and
non-bag-fee carriers found in the unweighted sample, this finding is likely explained by differences
across carriers and markets. The model predicts ticket prices for only two carriers in a single market,
whereas in reality there are many carriers serving thousands of markets. In particular, markets and
carriers will vary with respect to the types of consumers (e.g., value of checking a bag) and costs of
carrying checked baggage (e.g., travel distance and airport facilities). As these parameters change,
so will the impact of bag fees. The estimates in Table 1.4 are an average of the effect across all
markets and tickets. In the unweighted sample, all routes are equally weighted, allowing smaller
markets to have a greater influence on the results. Small carriers are also given more importance
in the unweighted sample. Due to the high variation in markets and carriers, it is not surprising
that effects are slightly different in magnitude. In contrast, the estimates of the weighted sample
are more likely to describe the effect of competitor bag fees on larger markets (e.g., bigger cities
and hubs) and larger carriers (e.g., legacy carriers and Southwest); thus, there is less variation in
the types of markets and carriers. The results of the interaction regressions, which aim to address
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variation in market characteristics, are discussed below.
To complement the above findings, columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.4 suggest the larger percentage
of competition with bag fees, the greater the reduction in ticket price. The unweighted [weighted]
results indicate that non-bag-fee carriers’ fares are 0.36 percent [0.43 percent] lower in markets where
25 percent of competitors’ passengers are subject to bag fees compared to markets where no carriers
have a bag fee. In markets where 75 percent of competitors’ passengers are subject to bag fees,
non-bag-fee carriers’ fares are 1.08 percent [1.29 percent] lower compared to markets without bag
fees. The impact on bag fee carriers is again greater in magnitude. Bag fee carriers’ fares are 1.28
percent [0.78 percent] lower in markets where 25 percent of competitors’ passengers face bag fees
compared to markets where no competitors charge a bag fee. The fare reduction increases to 3.83
percent [2.3 percent] in markets where 75 percent of competitors’ passengers are subject to bag fees.
These findings support the notion that a carrier will reduce its fares in response to a competitor
introducing a bag fee.
1.5.2 Effect of competitor bag fees and market characteristics
Table 1.5 presents results for interaction specifications which allow the effect of bag fees to
depend on market characteristics; thus, achieving a greater level of precision in the estimation and
allow further empirical investigation of the theory. Columns 1 and 2 present coefficient estimates
when additional interaction terms for earnings ratio - my proxy for the value of bag-checking services
- are included. To account for the cost of checking bags, columns 3 and 4 include interaction terms
for the distance of the flight.
The results reported in columns 1 and 2 suggest that a higher earnings ratio is correlated
with a smaller reduction in fares in response to competitor bag fees. Using the weighted results,
in a market with the median value of earnings ratio (0.0061), competitor bag fees lend a reduction
in average fares of 2.48 percent. In comparison, a market in the 90th percentile of earnings ratio
(0.0302) – a level that existing literature characterizes as a vacation route – the reduction in average
fares is only 1.82 percent.47 The effect of competitor bag fees approaches zero as earnings ratio
approaches its maximum, and there is no significant difference between non-bag-fee and bag fee
carriers.48
47Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) label a leisure (or vacation) route as one that includes an airport in a metropolitan
area with an earnings ratio above the 85th percentile.
48Values above the 95th percentile of earnings ratio actually lend a slight positive response to competitor bag fees.
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The estimated difference in the competitive effect of bag fees across levels of the earnings
ratio is small but still supports the prediction of higher values for bag-checking services coinciding
with smaller impacts of competitor bag fees. For a more vacation-like route, as measured by a
relatively high earnings ratio, an unbundling carrier has a greater incentive to offset the bag fee with
a comparable price cut since most consumers will continue to check a bag. Given the offsetting price
drop, a competing carrier will not have much to gain from changing its ticket price as the majority
of consumers compare its price to the unbundling carrier’s total price (ticket plus bag fee). This
point is illustrated in Figure 1.4(a). Confirming the theory, the competitive effect of bag fees trends
towards zero as earnings ratio increases.49
The estimates reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.5 indicate an increase in the market
distance results in a larger reduction in fares due to competitor bag fees. The average ticket price
for a non-bag-fee carrier in a market with the median distance (roughly 930 miles) drops by 2.2
percent when at least one competitor introduces a bag fee.50 However, in a market with a distance
equivalent to the 75th percentile (roughly 1,400 miles), the average percentage fare decline from a
competitor bag fee is 3.8 percent for non-bag-fee carriers. As for shorter routes, in a market with
a distance equal to the 25th percentile (roughly 550 miles), the reduction in ticket price is only 0.3
percent. A similar relationship between distance and the competitive effect of bag fees is found for
bag fee carriers.
A longer flight corresponds to greater costs in carrying checked luggage. As the cost in-
creases, the drop in a carrier’s ticket price from implementing a bag fee will be greater, leading
to more significant downward pressure on other carriers’ fares. Further, since carriers do not vary
bag fees across markets, the model shows there could be routes with very low transportation costs
of baggage, resulting in an increase in fares when competitors introduce bag fees. The estimates
give strong confirmation of this claim, as the shortest routes actually correspond to higher ticket
prices when competitor bag fees are present. Figure 1.4(b) clearly shows the relationship between
the competitive effect of bag fees and route length. As expected, there is a negative relationship as
well as a switch from a positive to negative effect. But again, the majority of routes have a negative
competitive effect of bag fees.
49As shown by the percentiles on the graph, the far right values for earnings ratio are only comprised of a few
markets, of most weight being Las Vegas and Atlantic City. Thus, even though it appears to become a positive
competitive effect, this finding should be taken lightly.
50I focus on the weighted results given the insignificant findings for non-bag-fee carriers when using the unweighted
sample. The expected relationship between the competitive effect and route distance is still present for bag fee carriers
in the unweighted sample.
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1.5.3 Nonstop vs Connecting Competition
Table 1.6 reports coefficient estimates for the effect of competitor bag fees while differentiat-
ing between nonstop and connecting competition. For both bag fee and non-bag-fee carriers, having
at least one nonstop competitor with a bag fee reduces ticket prices by 1.65 percent (using weighted
results). On the other hand, having at least one connecting competitor with a bag fee reduces ticket
prices by nearly 5 percent for non-bag-fee carriers and roughly 6 percent for bag fee carriers.
Bag checking services are more costly on connecting flights due to the additional handling
costs associated with moving luggage between airplanes. Due to these extra costs, a bag fee intro-
ducing carrier will drop its fare by a greater amount on connecting flights than nonstop flights, as
discouraging passengers from checking a bag results in greater cost savings. The greater the reduc-
tion in ticket price by the unbundling carrier, the larger the downward pressure on a competing
carrier’s ticket price. The results in Table 1.6 match this story of higher costs leading to a greater
(more negative) competitive effect of unbundling luggage and airfares.
1.5.4 Business vs Leisure Fares
The estimates from the interaction regressions confirm that the competitive effect of bag
fees varies across markets. I hypothesize that the impact of competitor bag fees will also vary
within markets due to carriers’ discrimination of leisure and business travelers. Table 1.7 presents
coefficient estimates for individual regressions corresponding to the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentile
fares. Since the 20th percentile is more representative of leisure travelers and the 80th percentile
more representative of business travelers, I expect a greater reduction in fares on the 80th percentile
in response to competitor bag fees.
The results indicate the reduction in fares is greater in magnitude on the higher end of
the fare distribution; thus, lending strong confirmation of the hypothesis above. In particular,
competitor bag fees are estimated to reduce the 20th percentile fare by roughly 1.2 to 2.5 percentage
points, while reducing the 80th percentile fare by about 1.6 to 3.7 percentage points, depending on
the specification and whether a carrier has an own bag fee. Given the mean fares at each percentile,
these effects correspond to a $1.50 to $3.15 reduction in the 20th percentile fare, and a $4.80 to
$11.28 reduction in the 80th percentile fare.
Although these results seem counterintuitive, with the fares of consumers who care the
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least about bag-checking services impacted the most by bag fees, these findings match the intuition
realized from the theoretical model. In a market with a high value of bag-checking services, the
introduction of a bag fee will cause the introducing carrier (carrier 1) to drastically reduce its fare.
Even with the large reduction in fares, the competing carrier (carrier 2) will not reduce its fares
by much, because a majority of the market will continue to check a bag when traveling with either
carrier. Thus, carrier 2 is actually competing with carrier 1’s ticket price plus bag fee, which limits
the downward pressure on fares from carrier 1 introducing bag fees. Suppose instead the market
value for bag-checking services is relatively low. Carrier 1 will still reduce its fare when it introduces
a bag fee but not by as much. In response, carrier 2 has to decrease its own fare, because the
majority of consumers prefer to not check a bag in return for carrier 1’s lower ticket price. In fact,
carrier 2 may have to drop its fare to almost the same amount as carrier 1’s in order to maintain a
decent share of the market.
1.5.5 Southwest Advertisement Effect
Table 1.8 reports coefficient estimates for regressions which include an interaction term for
whether Southwest competes in the market. The estimates suggest that the presence of Southwest
leads to higher fares (i.e., less of a reduction in fares due to competitor bag fees). On non-Southwest
markets, the estimated reduction in fares for bag fee carriers is roughly 4 percent. The effect on
fares is much weaker in Southwest markets, where competitor bag fees are correlated with a drop in
fares of just over 1 percent.
The evidence, while confirming the presence of Southwest influences the impact of bag fees,
is also in line with the difference between Southwest and non-Southwest markets being a product of
Southwest’s “Bags Fly Free” advertisements. Consumers flying on routes served by Southwest are
potentially more aware of bag fees given Southwest’s aggressive ad campaign. A carrier will receive
less pressure to reduce fares in response to competitor bag fees the more aware potential passengers
are of bag fees.
The results are not as consistent for non-bag-fee carriers. The unweighted results indicate
the impact of competitor bag fees are unaffected by Southwest’s presence, while the weighted results
suggest competitor bag fees only effect ticket prices on Southwest markets. Although these findings
do not support my initial prediction of the impact of advertisements on ticket prices, the results
could be explained by a difference in Southwest’s response to competitor bag fees compared to other
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carriers (particularly JetBlue). This possibility is discussed below.
1.5.6 Excluding Southwest fares from the analysis
A concern of the analysis above is that the coefficient on Comp Bag Fee is identifying a
unique strategy employed by Southwest as opposed to the more general effect of competitor bag
fees. In fact, a portion of the airline literature is dedicated to analyzing Southwest’s unique business
strategy and the impact it has on the overall market (Morrison (2001); Goolsbee and Syverson
(2008)). To eliminate the possibility of a Southwest bias, the basic regression and the percentile
regressions are estimated excluding Southwest observations.51
Table 1.9 reports coefficient estimates for regressions run while excluding Southwest fares.
Columns 1 and 2 present the basic results, while columns 3-6 report estimates for the 20th and
80th percentile fare regressions. Estimates for the coefficient of Comp Bag Fee become statistically
insignificant with the exclusion of Southwest, and even suggest an increase in the higher fares in
the weighted sample. The estimate of Comp Bag Fee is mostly influenced by JetBlue fares; thus,
this finding may suggest a JetBlue primary competition is different than those of Southwest. In
particular, JetBlue’s prices may be more influenced by the other low-cost carriers (e.g., Allegiant,
Spirit, etc.) than the legacy carriers and Southwest.
The theoretical model suggests an increase in fares in response to competitor bag fees could
only occur if the bag fee is substantially larger than the cost of transporting bags. A limitation of the
current setup is the assumption of identical costs across airlines. For the estimate of Comp Bag Fee
in Table 1.9 to match the theory, JetBlue’s primary competitors would need to have much lower cost
of bag-checking services than Southwest’s main competition. Or, in general, the majority of markets
JetBlue serves have lower costs of bag-checking services, such as shorter flights, less connections,
and fewer airport fees.
1.6 Conclusions
This paper presents theory and evidence of a competitive effect of unbundling which was
previously overlooked in the literature. The theoretically model shows the possibility that a firm
will alter its prices when a competitor unbundles its product, regardless of whether the firm in
51Southwest competition is still accounted for in these regressions.
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question unbundles as well. In contrast to the straight forward predictions of the own-price effect of
product unbundling, the direction in which prices change (either an increase or decrease) in respone
to competitors unbundling depends on characteristics of the firms and market. The finding of a
competitive effect is likely to be relevant in various industries that have experienced unbundling,
including cable television, hotels, credit cards, cell phone services, and air travel. Thus, any analysis
of pricing in these industries, especially if it could lead to regulation, must take into account the full
impact of add-on fees.
Confirming the theoretical results, I find evidence of the competitive effect from unbundling
while examining airfares in the U.S. airline industry. Despite ambiguity in the theoretical predictions,
I find the majority of carriers and markets react to competitor bag fees by reducing ticket prices.
Further, the reduction in airfares due to competitors charging bag fees is greater on routes that
include a connection, longer routes, routes that have a higher ratio of business to leisure travelers,
and routes not serviced by Southwest. I also find the competitive effect of unbundling to be larger on
fares that are more representative of passengers with lower values for bag-checking services (business
fares) by estimating the effect of competitor bag fees on different parts of the fare distribution.
Although this paper does not formally give a welfare analysis of bag fees, the results suggest
the negative attention towards bag fees and the coinciding discussions are incomplete due to a lack of
consideration for the effects they will have on airfares. Given my findings, I suspect the U.S. airline
industry is characterized by an average consumer with a relatively small valuation for bag-checking
services. Thus, the introduction of bag fees has led to significant cost savings for the airlines, some
of which has been passed through to consumers (at least those who do not check luggage). Given the
cost savings, it seems bag fees may not be as harmful of an addition to air travel as portrayed by the
media. Of course, understanding why airlines began to charge bag fees would aid in analyzing the
full effect of unbundling luggage and airfares. While it seems the switch to bag fees was probably a
combination of changes in costs and consumer preferences, this question is left for future research.
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Figure 1.1: Demand Structure under Asymmetric Bag Fee Policies
x
θ
10
1
x∗ = 1
2
x∗H ≡ 12 + p2−p1−Fee2t
θ∗
Carrier 1 Carrier 2
A
B
Notes: The figure shows an example of the demand structure given equilibrium prices when carrier 1
charges a bag fee and carrier 2 does not. Consumers located in area A purchase the premium good
from carrier 1 (flight and bag check). Consumers located in area B purchase the base good from carrier
1 (flight only). All consumers located to the right of the kinked curve purchase the premium good from
carrier 2 (all of carrier 2’s passengers check a bag). If neither carrier has a bag fee or both have equal
bag fees, the carriers split the market and the demand structure is represented by a straight line at
x∗ = 12 . Thus, the figure shows asymmetric bag fee policies give a unique demand structure due to
dissimilar incentives and differing equilibrium prices. Carrier 1 now sells to a larger proportion of
consumers with a low willingness to pay for bag-checking services (low θ), while carrier 2 sells to a
larger proportion of consumers with a high willingness to pay for bag-checking services (high θ).
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Figure 1.2: Fraction of Passengers by Carrier Type
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(a) Passengers subject to a first bag fee
0
.2
.4
.6
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Legacy Other LCC
JetBlue Southwest
(b) Passengers allowed free first bag check
Notes: Panel (a) shows the fraction of passengers subject to a first bag fee according to type of
carrier: legacy or low-cost. See Table 1.3 for a list of legacy and low-cost carriers, and note that
“Other LCC” refers to all low-cost carriers except for JetBlue and Southwest. Panel (b) shows the
fraction of passengers who are allowed a free first bag check according to type of carrier. Southwest
and JetBlue are the only carriers that do not introduce a bag fee over the sample period. See Figure
1.3(a) for the fraction of total passengers who are subject to bag fees.
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Figure 1.3: Fraction of Passengers for Various Scenarios
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(a) Fraction of all passengers flying on a carrier with
an own-bag-fee
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(c) Fraction of passengers subject to a bag fee flying
on a carrier with a bag fee competitor in the market
Notes: Panel (a) shows the percentage of all passengers who are subject to a bag fee. Panel (b)
shows the percentage of passengers who are flying on a non-bag-fee carrier in a market where the
carrier has competitors with bag fees. In other words, Panel (b) presents the percentage of
passengers where Comp Bag Fee equals 1 out of passengers where Bag Fee equals 0. Conversely,
Panel (c) shows the percentage of passengers who are flying on a bag fee carrier in a market where
the carrier has competitors with bag fees. Thus, Panel(c) presents the percentage of passengers
where Comp Bag Fee equals 1 out of passengers where Bag Fee equals 1.
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Figure 1.4: Expected Effect of Competitor Bag Fees across Market Characteristics
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(b) Varying market distance
Notes: In both figures dashed lines represent the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles for the respective
market parameter. Panel (a) shows how the competitive effect of bag fees changes across values of
earnings ratio, while panel (b) shows how the impact changes across differing market distances. The
average line and standard error bars were calculated using the weighted estimates for non-bag-fee
carriers from Table 1.5. The range for each plot covers the observed minimum and maximum value
for the relevant market parameter.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics - Price, Bag Fee, and Market Variables
Not Weighted Passenger Weighted
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Price Variables
Fare 243.08 97.50 189.88 67.56
20th Percentile Fare 171.93 88.69 125.12 41.91
50th Percentile Fare 217.47 97.50 163.53 54.23
80th Percentile Fare 303.23 132.83 242.92 96.20
Bag Fee Variables
Bag Fee 0.506 0.492 0.393 0.482
Comp Bag Fee 0.532 0.491 0.392 0.482
Pct Comp Bag Fee 0.449 0.455 0.350 0.446
Market Variables
connect 0.826 0.379 0.277 0.448
distance 1392.9 684.6 1058.8 654.9
population 2.41 2.07 4.00 2.87
income 10.43 9.97 18.05 14.24
earnings ratio 0.014 0.029 0.021 0.041
Number of Observations: 483,496
Number of Passengers: 126,142,178
Notes: The table presents means and standard deviations for price variables, bag fee variables, and market variables.
The first two columns present non-weighted means and standard deviations, while the last two columns present
these statistics when calculated with passenger weights.
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Table 1.3: Carrier Introduction Dates for First Bag Fees (by amount)
$15 First Bag Fee $20 First Bag Fee $25 First Bag Fee
Legacy Carriers
United June 13, 2008 June 10, 2009 Jan. 21, 2010
American June 15, 2008 Aug. 13, 2009 Feb. 1, 2010
US Airways July 9, 2008 July 9, 2009 Oct. 7, 2009
Northwest Aug. 28, 2008 Aug. 4, 2009 N/A†
Continental Oct. 7, 2008 Aug. 19, 2009 Jan. 16, 2010
Midwest Oct. 21, 2008 Oct. 1, 2009 N/A‡
Delta Dec. 5, 2008 Aug. 4, 2009 Jan. 5, 2010
Alaska July 7, 2009 June 16, 2010 Oct. 30, 2013
Low Cost Carriers
Spirit June 20, 2007∗ Feb. 20, 2008 June 20, 2008
Allegiant Oct. 23, 2007∗ missing missing
Sun Country Oct. 1, 2008 missing missing
Frontier Nov. 1, 2008 Oct. 1, 2009 July 11, 2013
AirTran Dec. 5, 2008 Sept. 1, 2010 Feb. 13, 2013
Virgin America May 5, 2009 Sept. 10, 2009 Mar. 1, 2010
Notes: The table shows flight dates when first bag fees take effect. For example, a $15 first bag fee was in effect
for Delta flights on or after Dec. 5, 2008. These dates were collected from various news articles. Southwest
and JetBlue do not charge a first bag fee.
† Merger with Delta was completed on January 31, 2010.
‡ Merged with Frontier in 2011.
∗ Both Allegiant and Spirit started with a $10 first bag fee but quickly increased it to $15.
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Table 1.4: Basic Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
weighted weighted
Comp Bag Fee -0.0112*** -0.0193***
(0.0037) (0.0047)
Bag Fee × Comp Bag Fee -0.0240*** -0.0080
(0.0042) (0.0059)
Pct Comp Bag Fee -0.0144*** -0.0172***
(0.0040) (0.0048)
Bag Fee × Pct Comp Bag Fee -0.0367*** -0.0135***
(0.0048) (0.0066)
N 483,496 483,496 483,496 483,496
adj. R2 0.4481 0.8793 0.4485 0.8793
Notes: All regressions include carrier-time and market fixed effects. The table shows the average effect of competitor
bag fees on carriers’ ticket prices while differentiating between carriers that have a bag fee and those that don’t.
The dependent variable is carrier-market average logged fares. Regressions in columns (2) and (4) are weighted by
passengers. Comp Bag Fee is an indicator for whether a carrier faces a competitor with a bag fee, and Pct Comp
Bag Fee is the percentage of competitor passengers flying with a carrier which imposes a bag fee. Bag Fee is an
indicator for whether the carrier has an own bag fee. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by market.
See Table A.2 for coefficient estimates of additional competition and market variables included in the regressions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.5: Regressions Including Interactions with Market Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
weighted weighted
Comp Bag Fee -0.0144*** -0.0265*** 0.0167 0.2340***
(0.0039) (0.0054) (0.0313) (0.0449)
Bag Fee × Comp Bag Fee -0.0231*** -0.0043 0.0684** -0.1278***
(0.0044) (0.0066) (0.0317) (0.0495)
Market Earnings Ratio
Comp Bag Fee × Earn Ratio 0.1923*** 0.2734***
(0.0610) (0.0826)
Bag Fee × Comp Bag Fee × Earn Ratio -0.0354 -0.0689
(0.0657) (0.1028)
Market Distance
Comp Bag Fee × ln(Dist) -0.0041 -0.0375***
(0.0043) (0.0065)
Bag Fee × Comp Bag Fee × ln(Dist) -0.0129*** 0.0181***
(0.0044) (0.0070)
N 483,496 483,496 483,496 483,496
adj. R2 0.4481 0.8794 0.4482 0.8798
Notes: All regressions include carrier-time and market fixed effects. The table shows the average effect of competitor bag fees
on carriers’ prices while interacted with market characteristic variables. The dependent variable for all regressions is the log
of the average fare for the carrier-market. Regressions in columns (2) and (4) are weighted by passengers. Earn Ratio is the
higher value of accommodation earnings over non-farm earnings between the two end cities of the market. A higher Earn Ratio
indicates a market with more leisure travelers (more vacation-like route). Dist is the average market distance flown. See Table
A.3 for coefficient estimates of additional competition and market variables included in the regressions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 1.8: Effect of Advertisements - Southwest vs Non-Southwest Markets
(1) (2)
weighted
Comp Bag Fee -0.0097** 0.0061
(0.0049) (0.0075)
Bag Fee × Comp Bag Fee -0.0378*** -0.0394***
(0.0054) (0.0086)
Southwest Market × Comp Bag Fee 0.0025 -0.0350***
(0.0055) (0.0091)
Southwest Market × Bag Fee × Comp Bag Fee 0.0361*** 0.0601***
(0.0059) (0.0100)
Southwest Market -0.0315*** -0.0347***
(0.0086) (0.0115)
N 483,496 483,496
adj. R2 0.4485 0.8796
Notes: All regressions include carrier-time and market fixed effects. The table shows the average
effect of competitor bag fees on carriers’ prices while accounting for whether Southwest is present
in the market. The dependent variable is carrier-market average logged fares. Regression in
column (2) is weighted by passengers. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered by
market. See Table A.2 for coefficient estimates of additional competition and market variables
included in the regressions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Chapter 2
Do airlines charge bag fees because
of price discrimination?
2.1 Introduction
Add-on pricing theory suggests a firm selling both a base and an add-on good can increase
profits by charging an add-on fee as opposed to bundling the add-on with the base good. The add-on
fee works as a price discriminating tool by sorting consumers based on their willingness to pay for
the add-on. However, when there is little to no heterogeneity in willingness to pay, introducing an
add-on fee will not increase profits and could even decrease profits (Pierce and Winter (1996); Ellison
(2005); Shulman and Geng (2013)). Therefore, a firm will only charge an add-on fee when there
exists a sufficient amount of heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness to pay. This paper empirically
tests the theoretical implications of add-on fees as a price discriminating tool by analyzing the timing
of bag fees in the U.S. airline industry.
The introduction of bag fees by U.S. airline carriers between 2007-2009 continued the growing
trend of product unbundling in the industry.1 Since their introduction, bag fees have consistently
produced roughly $3 billion in revenue per year for the industry. While there is little debate over
whether airlines have benefited from unbundling bag-checking services and air travel, why airlines
made the switch when they did is largely up in the air. Adding to the mystery of the timing is
1Items such food, drinks, blankets, and bag-checking services are no longer standard with the coach-class flight
ticket for the majority of U.S. airlines.
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the fact that both Southwest and JetBlue did not introduce a fee for the first checked bag.2 A
potential explanation is that price discrimination through bag fees became profitable because of a
change in demand. In particular, an increase in the heterogeneity of consumers’ willingness to pay
for bag-checking services prior to the introduction of bag fees would be consistent with the add-on
pricing theory.
Using the Department of Transportation’s 10% sample of U.S. airline tickets, I analyze how
each airline’s demand for bag-checking services changed over the time prior to bag fees. The data do
not indicate which passengers check a bag, nor whether a passenger is traveling for business or leisure,
so there is no direct and simple measure of the demand for bag-checking services within the data.
Instead, I construct proxies to measure demand by relying on the distinction between business and
leisure travelers, where leisure travelers generally have a higher willingness to pay for bag-checking
services than business travelers. The two measures of consumer heterogeneity I construct are: an
index explaining the degree to which a route is a “vacation route” and the level of route-specific
price dispersion.
For the first measure of consumer heterogeneity, Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) show there is
less variation in demand on more vacation-like routes (mostly leisure travelers). In contrast, a route
between two large cities (in terms of population) encompasses a greater mix of business and leisure
travelers which implies greater heterogeneity in consumers. As for the other measure of consumer
heterogeneity, price dispersion on any route indicates the variation in consumer willingness to pay
primarily through differences in time of purchase. Borenstein and Rose (1994) and Gerardi and
Shapiro (2009) show greater price dispersion is correlated with a greater mix of business and leisure
travelers.
For the price discrimination story of add-on pricing to fit the data, I expect to observe a
decrease in vacation route passengers and/or an increase in price dispersion for each airline prior
to their implementation of bag fees. Fewer vacation route passengers and greater price dispersion
would both suggest a higher degree of consumer heterogeneity in terms of willingness to pay to check
a bag. Moreover, the relevant level of observation is at each airline’s entire flight network because
airlines do not vary bag fees across routes. The invariability of bag fees indicates the decision to
charge bag fees is done through a cost-benefit analysis of their entire network of flights. Therefore,
2JetBlue did introduce a fee for the second checked bag along with all the other airlines in 2007 and JetBlue
eventually introduced a first checked bag fee in 2015. Southwest, on the other hand, has always and continues to offer
the first two bags checked at no additional charge.
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my analysis relies on weighted averages of the consumer demand measures across all routes in each
airline’s domestic network.
Contrary to the price discrimination story, I do not find consistent evidence indicating an
increase in consumer heterogeneity for airlines who eventually introduced a bag fee. Further, the
trends of bag-fee-introducing airlines over the time period of my sample do not appear significantly
different from the non-bag-fee airlines, Southwest and JetBlue. These results do not allow me to
infer consumer heterogeneity as the cause for bag fee introductions nor can I reject the hypothesis
given the limitations of the data. Demand changes may be an important factor, but further research
into other factors, such as changes in costs, is needed to fully understand why airlines introduced
bag fees.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the existing theories
of product unbundling and highlights the implications for the airline industry. Section 2.3 describes
the data and methods of analysis. Section 2.4 presents and discusses the results, and Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 Theory of Add-on Fees and Price Discrimination
The growing literature on add-on pricing can be viewed as a subset of the standard price
bundling theory. Adams and Yellen (1976), in their seminal paper, introduced three different pricing
strategies for selling two goods: pure components (no bundle), pure bundling (only offer bundled
product), and mixed bundling (offer goods both individually and as a bundle).3 Add-on pricing is a
unique scenario where the two goods are related in a particular way. One good is considered a base
good (flight) and has value to the consumer on its own. The other good is known as the add-on
(bag-checking service) and is only valuable to the buyer if purchased with the base good. Given the
distinct relationship between the add-on and base good, a firm is left with two pricing strategies:
pure bundling (no add-on fee) or mixed bundling (charge a add-on fee).
Pierce and Winter (1996) examine a monopoly setting where the firm sells a base good and
add-on to two individuals. These individuals vary in their willingness to pay for both the base good
and add-on, with one individual having a lower reservation price for both goods. The firm’s decision
3Before Adams and Yellen (1976), Stigler (1963) discussed the profitability of bundling by illustrating how a
monopolist of multiple movie films could increase its profits by selling movies in a package as opposed to separate
goods.
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is whether to sell the base good and add-on as a single bundle to both individuals, or sell the two
goods separately (i.e., charge an add-on fee).4 If the firm charges an add-on fee, it must set prices in
order to sort consumers based on their reservation prices for the products. To maximize profits, the
monopolist sets a high enough add-on fee in order to deter the consumer with the low willingness
to pay from purchasing the add-on while keeping the fee low enough to still encourage the high
willingness to pay consumer to buy the add-on.
Pierce and Winter (1996) show when consumers have similar reservation prices for the add-
on good the firm is better off offering only the bundled product. In this case, the additional profits
from charging a higher price to the high value consumer do not outweigh the lost profits from no
longer selling the add-on to the low value consumer; thus, the firm should not use the add-on fee to
sort consumers. If there is a large difference in willingness to pay between the consumers, the firm
can increase profits by using the add-on fee to discriminate between the two consumers.5
The intuition from the monopoly setup carries over into models of competition. Ellison
(2005) examines the add-on pricing decision of two firms competing in a market with two consumer
types – again, differentiating between high and low willingness to pay. He finds the benefits of
price discrimination from an add-on fee become relevant only once there is sufficient difference
between the consumers’ willingness to pay.6 Shulman and Geng (2013) expand upon a similar
model of competitive add-on pricing by having the firms differ in quality of their products. The
quality difference, as well as heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness to pay, leads to several possible
equilibria, including the possibility of one firm charging an add-on fee while the other does not.
Asymmetric add-on fees are mainly driven by quality differences across firms; nonetheless, there
must be sufficient heterogeneity in consumer preferences for either firm to utilize add-on fees.7
4Pierce and Winter (1996) describe the firms decision as choice between the pure bundling strategy or the mixed
bundling strategy. In fact, Pierce and Winter (1996) do not mention add-on pricing but their assumptions provide a
relationship between the firm’s two goods that exactly matches that of a base good and add-on. Thus, for consistency,
I describe their findings in the context of add-on pricing as opposed to using standard bundling terminology.
5Fruchter et al. (2011) address the same question of when add-on fees should be charged using a similar model of
monopoly add-on pricing with the addition of non-zero costs and allowing for two segments of consumers – high and
low value consumers. They find, in line with Pierce and Winter (1996), add-on fees are only profit improving if the
consumer segments vary enough in willingness to pay for the add-on.
6A large portion of the add-on literature, including Ellison (2005), focuses on the impact “boundedly rational
consumers,” who are consumers that are unaware of add-on fees, have on a firm’s pricing strategy and profits. This
aspect of the literature is mostly omitted from my discussion as it seems unlikely to have a significant impact on an
airline’s decision to implement bag fees given the considerable amount of repeated interactions with air travelers.
7Shulman and Geng (2013) assume some fraction of consumers never buy the add-on while all remaining consumers
always buy the add-on. In order for add-on fees to be profit improving in their model there must be a relatively high
mix of these two types of consumers – i.e., there must be a sufficient level of consumer heterogeneity in willingness to
pay for the add-on.
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2.2.1 Theoretical Implications for the Airline Industry
The consensus in the add-on pricing literature is that a sufficient amount of consumer
heterogeneity is needed for add-on fees to increase profits. In the context of the airline industry,
an airline will only introduce a bag fee if there is enough variation in consumers’ willingness to pay
for bag-checking services. If an airline’s demand changed from a situation of very little difference in
willingness to pay across passengers to a scenario with relatively significant heterogeneity, the airline
would then have an incentive to charge a bag fee. A shift of that nature could explain why airlines
introduced bag fees between 2007-2009.
An important fact about the implementation of bag fees is airlines do not vary the fees across
routes. For example, when Delta introduced a bag fee of $15 in 2008, passengers were subject to the
same $15 fee regardless of where they were flying in the U.S. Therefore, the demand for bag-checking
services on any particular route are not the sole determinant for whether an airline imposes a bag
fee on the route. Any airline’s decision to introduce bag fees must have been based on a large, global
cost-benefit analysis of their entire network of flights. This suggests an airline will introduce a bag
fee only when a majority of its domestic network enjoys a sufficient degree of consumer heterogeneity.
In other words, the decision is based on an airline’s average route heterogeneity and not overall flight
network heterogeneity.
2.3 Data and Methods
To examine changes in demand for air travel, I use the Airline Origin and Destination Survey
(DB1B), published by the U.S. Department of Transportation. The DB1B dataset is a 10% random
sample of all domestic tickets issued by U.S. reporting airlines. These data provide information on
flight fares, itinerary (including origin, destination, and connection airports), airline carrier, and the
number of passengers who fly an itinerary at a given fare. The data are quarterly, with my dataset
spanning from 2002:Q1 – 2010:Q4.
The analysis of this paper is mainly concerned with the types of markets and passengers each
airline serves. A market is defined as two end-point airports, where directionality is suppressed. The
carrier of a flight is defined by the ticket holding carrier as opposed to the operating carrier to identify
feeder carriers with their mainline partner.8 The sample includes Legacy carriers: American, United,
8Flights which include a switch in the ticket holding carrier are dropped.
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Delta, Continental, US Airways, Alaska, and Midwest, as well as Low-Cost carriers Southwest:
JetBlue, AirTran, Frontier, Spirit, Allegiant, and Sun Country. The final sample includes over
40,000 unique markets, covering roughly 309 million passengers.9
All airlines, with the exception of Southwest and JetBlue, introduced bag fees between
2007–2009 (see Table 1.3). My hypothesis is a change in demand for bag-checking services led to
the introduction of bag fees; therefore, I construct several proxies to measure trends in demand.
The most relevant characteristic of consumers I can measure is whether passengers are traveling for
business or leisure. Business travelers, or simply those consumers who buy tickets at short notice,
generally have a lower willingness to pay for checking a bag, while vacationers, or those who buy
well in advance, are more likely to have a higher willingness to pay. The greater the mix of business
and leisure travelers, the greater the heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness to pay. Even though
the data do not indicate whether a ticket is for business or leisure, there are several methods to
approximate the mix of travelers on a market.
To measure how vacation-like a market is I use city-level data on industry earnings to
calculate the ratio of accommodation (hotel) earnings to all non-farm earnings at each end-point
city.10 The highest value of the ratio among the two end-point cities of a market is recorded as the
earnings ratio for the market. Previous studies, most notably Borenstein (1989), Borenstein and
Rose (1994), and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), show flights including markets with a higher earnings
ratio are more representative of a vacation route, consisting of mostly leisure travelers.
The earnings ratio will vary across markets, so I calculate the passenger weighted earnings
ratio for each airline for every quarter of the sample to examine how an airline’s mix of vacation-like
markets changes over time. I hypothesize the airlines which implemented bag fees, which are all
but Southwest and JetBlue, will have a decrease in their average earnings ratio leading up to the
bag fee introduction. A relatively high earnings ratio indicates a more vacation-like route, which
encompasses mostly leisure travelers with similar willingness to pay. Alternatively, a relatively low
9I apply several common filters used in the airline economics literature to construct a comparable dataset and
eliminate outliers. Observations are dropped if creditability is in doubt (when the variable dollarcred in the raw data
is equal to zero), the itinerary fare is greater than five times the Standard Industry Fare Level (SIFL), the directional
fare is below $25 (roundtrip flights are split into two observations and the fare is divided by two), or the itinerary is
open jaw (roundtrip passenger who doesn’t return to the starting airport). Furthermore, I drop one-way itineraries
with more than one directional break (travel break other than a plane change), and I drop roundtrip itineraries with
more than two directional breaks. My data include both nonstop and connecting service, however, to eliminate odd
flights, itineraries with more than three segments in a direction are dropped. Finally, only travel within the lower 48
states is included in my sample.
10Data on local industry specific earnings were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (table CA5, Personal
Income by Major Component and Earnings by Industry).
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earnings ratio suggests the route should not be characterized as a vacation route, and thus, may
indicate a route with a greater mix of consumer types (e.g., vacationers and business travelers).
A greater mix of consumer types lends greater heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness to pay and
vice versa. Therefore, a lower average earnings ratio indicates an airline serves fewer passengers on
the more vacation-like routes, or in other words, services more markets with greater variation in
willingness to pay for bag-checking services.
The route-specific earnings ratio appears to do a sufficient job identifying the top vacation
routes versus all other routes; however, the precision of earnings ratio as a measure of consumer
heterogeneity among all the routes is questionable. Figure 2.1 presents the distribution of values for
earnings ratio over the whole sample to illustrate the overall skewness and low variation. Given the
distribution in Figure 2.1, using an airline’s average earnings ratio as a measure of heterogeneity in
consumers across its entire flight network may be problematic.
To alleviate the concerns of relying on the average earnings ratio alone, I compare two
categories of markets: vacation routes and big-city routes. Vacation routes are defined as any route
with an earnings ratio above the 85th percentile. Big-city routes are defined as any route with both
end-point airports located in the top 35 largest metropolitan areas by population.11 The complete
list of vacation and big-city routes are in Tables 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. Given these distinct routes
I calculate the ratio of passengers on these routes to total passengers.
Big-city routes encompass a greater mix of business and leisure travelers than vacation
routes, and thus, encompass greater heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness to pay (Gerardi and
Shapiro (2009)). Therefore, big-city routes are more likely to have sufficient variation in willingness
to pay for bag fees to increase profits than vacation routes. The expectation is bag fee introducing
airlines will see a drop in vacation route passengers and a rise in big-city route passengers leading
up to the introduction of bag fees.
As an alternative approach to measuring the mix of passengers across an airline’s network
I calculate a measure of price dispersion on routes for each airline. Any particular airline-market
combination for a given time period encompasses a full distribution of fares mostly due to airlines
price discriminating according to time of purchase. Similar to Borenstein and Rose (1994) and
Gerardi and Shapiro (2009), I measure price dispersion at the airline-market-time level by computing
11Data on local area population were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (table CA1, Personal Income,
Population, Per Capita Personal Income.)
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a Gini coefficient of ticket prices.12 Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) show that the Gini coefficient is
positively correlated to consumer heterogeneity where a high Gini coefficient indicates greater price
dispersion, or greater inequality, and thus, greater variation in consumer types (e.g., time of purchase,
business versus leisure).13 Figure 2.2 illustrates the difference in price dispersion by comparing the
distribution of ticket prices on a Leisure route to the distribution on a Big-City route.
The Gini coefficient lends a similar measure of consumer heterogeneity to the earnings
ratio, but is a more precise measure of variation in tastes across routes. Table 2.3 presents passenger
weighted means for earnings ratio and Gini for several subsamples. These statistics show leisure
routes have lower price dispersion and big-city routes have higher price dispersion, on average. The
expectation is bag fee airlines will show an increase in their average Gini coefficient (passenger
weighted across all markets served) during the time period prior to bag fees.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Trends in Mix of Route Types – Business vs Leisure Routes
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 present time-series for each major airline carrier’s average earnings ratio
(weighted by number of passengers) from 2002-2010. Each graph includes the average earnings ratio
for the entire industry as a point of reference. Figure 2.3 shows most Legacy carriers have very low
average earnings ratios, which is no surprise considering their focus on larger cities and business
travel. It is worth noting U.S. Airways’ drastic change around 2006-2007 is due to the acquisition of
America West. Low-Cost carriers (LCCs) generally serve smaller, niche markets and focus on leisure
travelers. Figure 2.4 shows most LCCs have relatively high average earnings ratios compared to the
industry average.
While there are stark differences for earnings ratios between Legacy and Low-Cost carriers,
the evidence does not suggest a consistent difference between bag fee airlines and Southwest and
12The Gini coefficient is calculated as follows: Gini = 1 − 2 ×
(∑N
i=1 farei × Passengersitotal revenues
)
×[
Passengersi
total passengers
+
(
1−∑ij=1 Passengersjtotal passengers)], where N is the number of different fare level tickets reported by
an airline on a route, farei is the ticket price for the ith ticket, Passengersi is the number of passengers traveling at
that fare, and total revenue and total passengers are at the airline-route level (Borenstein and Rose (1994)).
13Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) estimate the impact of competition on price dispersion by using the Gini coefficient
as their measure of carrier-route level price dispersion. They find the effect of competition on the Gini coefficient
is more pronounced on big-city routes, suggesting price discrimination is more prevalent on big-city routes. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that the Gini coefficient is a good proxy for heterogeneity in consumers’ willingness to
pay on a given route.
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JetBlue. In fact, for most airlines, the average earnings ratio stays around the same level over time.
There are a few examples – United, Delta, and American – of slight downward trends. Allegiant,
Sun Country, and Frontier each show a more significant drop in earnings ratio over time, where
Allegiant’s fall in earnings ratio is the most convincing. Other bag fee airlines actually show an
increase in earnings ratio over time. Overall, the evidence from average earnings ratios does not
suggest an increase in consumer heterogeneity for most bag fee airlines. Southwest and JetBlue
actually see an decrease in earnings ratio, suggesting they now serve a greater mix of consumer
types – the opposite trend the theory predicts for non-bag-fee airlines.
As discussed in Section 2.3, the average earnings ratio has flaws as a single measure of con-
sumer heterogeneity, and thus, examining the mix of “Leisure” and “Big-City” routes is potentially
more informative. Figures 2.5-2.8 present time-series for the fraction of passengers on Big-City and
Leisure routes for each airline. These percentages are more precise measures of consumer hetero-
geneity, where the average Big-City route will have relatively large heterogeneity compared to the
average Leisure or vacation route. With that being said, the evidence is still inconsistent with the
theory.
Figure 2.5 presents some evidence of an increase in Big-City passengers for Legacy carriers
leading up to bag fees. Delta, Northwest, U.S. Airways, and Midwest each show an increase in Big-
city passengers, while the other Legacy carriers serve roughly the same fraction of Big-City passengers
over the time period. In contrast, Figure 2.6 shows none of the bag fee LCCs saw an increase in
Big-City passengers. Southwest and JetBlue actually have an increase in Big-City passengers, which
opposes the idea that these airlines should not see an increase in consumer heterogeneity.
In similar fashion, Figures 2.7 and 2.8 do not suggest a consistent trend of Leisure passengers
for all bag fee introducing airlines. For bag fee airlines, particularly Legacy carriers, the fraction of
total passengers on a Leisure route is roughly constant over time (except for seasonal trends), with
a few moving towards more Leisure passengers. There is no discernible change in the fraction of
Leisure passengers for Southwest and JetBlue either.
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2.4.2 Trends in Mix of Passenger Types – Consumer Heterogeneity on
Routes
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 present time-series of each airline’s average Gini coefficient (weighted
by passengers) from 2002-2010. The route-level Gini coefficient is a proxy for route-specific hetero-
geneity in consumers’ willingness to pay. An airline’s average Gini in a time period measures the
average variation in consumers’ willingness to pay for its entire domestic flight network. A greater
average Gini coefficient is correlated with greater consumer heterogeneity for an airline; therefore, I
expect to find an increase in the average Gini for airlines who eventually introduced bag fees.
Figure 2.9 shows there was a sharp decrease in the average Gini coefficient across all Legacy
carriers. The drop in price dispersion can partly be explained by the increase in competition from
LCCs (Gerardi and Shapiro (2009)). Regardless of the reason for less price dispersion, the trend
is the exact opposite of what is expected. A decrease in price dispersion suggests a decrease in
consumer heterogeneity, and thus, less incentive to unbundle the product. Some of the Legacy
carriers see a rise in their average Gini (Alaska, Midwest, Continental) in the years closer to their
bag fee introductions; however, this trend is not consistent across all of the bag fee airlines.
Figure 2.10 presents the Gini coefficient time-series for LCCs. There is a common trend
of increasing price dispersion among LCCs. Allegiant and Spirit, the first two airlines to introduce
bag fees, did see a significant increase in their average Gini over the time period. Sun Country and
Frontier had similar up ticks in price dispersion, with AirTran the only bag fee LCC to not have a
noticeable increase. The evidence for the bag fee LCCs appears to be consistent with the theory;
however, price dispersion for both Southwest and JetBlue also increased over the time period. Since
there is not a clear distinction between the non-bag-fee airlines and bag fee airlines, the evidence is
still not conclusive in favor of a change in demand being correlated to bag fee implementation.
To further investigate the changes in price dispersion, I examine each airline’s average Gini
coefficient while differentiating between Leisure and Big-City routes for both Legacy carriers (Figures
2.11 and 2.12) and LCCs (Figures 2.13 and 2.14). Price dispersion on Leisure routes has an obvious
upward trend for many Legacy and Low-cost carriers. Therefore, the upward trend in many of the
LCCs’ average Gini across all routes can be explained by the trend found on these more vacation-
like routes and the fact that LCCs serve more Leisure route passengers than those on Big-City
routes. As for Big-City routes, average Gini coefficients dropped early in the sample period but then
57
changed very little over time for the larger Legacy carriers – United, Delta, American, U.S. Airways,
and Northwest – which is expected given the findings presented in Figure 2.9. Other airlines, such
as Southwest, JetBlue, Spirit, Alaska, Continental, and Midwest, saw moderate increases in their
average Gini coefficient on Big-City routes over the sample period. Again, an unsurprising result
given earlier findings when looking at average Gini coefficients for all routes.
Finally, Figures 2.15-2.18 present each airline’s average Gini coefficients over time when
separated between nonstop and connecting service. While distinguishing between nonstop and con-
necting service may not greatly enhance the analysis, it does allow for comparison across the two
types of services. Further, one may worry that price dispersion on connecting routes is higher due
to variability in the costs from extra stops.
Splitting up connecting and nonstop routes does not change the results in any unexpected
way. The trends seen in Figures 2.9 and 2.10 are mainly driven by Gini coefficients on the nonstop
routes. This makes sense as LCCs have always had a majority of their passengers on nonstop service
and Legacy carriers have decreased the quantity of connecting flights in recent years (see Figures
2.19 and 2.20).
2.4.3 Further Discussion
The evidence from both measures of consumer heterogeneity, earnings ratio and the Gini
coefficient, does not convincingly support the theoretical reasons for why a firm unbundles its prod-
uct. The inconclusive evidence suggests other forces may have led to the introduction of bag fees.
In particular, it is plausible that supply-side changes could have caused the shift in the industry,
such as a change in the cost of bag-checking services. That is not to say demand did not still play
an important role.
Spirit and Allegiant, the first two airlines to introduce bag fees, did see a significant increase
in average price dispersion for their entire networks over the sample period. The increase in price
dispersion implies an increase in consumer heterogeneity which could explain their introduction of
bag fees. A first-mover argument could be made where these early adopters gave way to the bag
fee introductions from the other airlines. Existing work on add-on pricing has yet to provide a clear
prediction of the impact of one competitor unbundling on another firm’s decision to unbundle.14
14As noted in Section 2.2, theories on competitive add-on pricing generally rely on symmetrical firms, which disallows
the researcher to identify the impact of only one of the competing firms unbundling.
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Since this paper is empirically focused on examining existing theories, the implications of a first-
mover theory in add-on pricing is left for future research.
Finally, it is worth noting the limitations of the data. Ideally, I would have information on
checked luggage at the passenger level and could then analyze the change in demand for checked
luggage leading up to bag fees. The DB1B dataset does not provide any information on baggage.
Moreover, my analysis relies on the difference between business and leisure travelers. Not only are
my measures approximations, because the data do not indicate seat class nor time of purchase, but
the differences between leisure and business does not completely capture variation in willingness to
pay for bag-checking services. For these reasons, the non-results found cannot be taken as evidence
that consumer heterogeneity did not lead to bag fees.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper explores the decision of airlines to unbundle bag-checking services and airfares
by analyzing whether a change in consumers’ willingness to pay led to the introduction of bag fees.
Economic theory predicts charging a bag fee is only profit improving when there is a sufficient
amount of variation in consumers’ willingness to pay for bag-checking services. To be consistent
with the theory, I expect bag fee airlines to have an increase in consumer heterogeneity across their
entire network of flights leading up to the unbundling. In addition, I expect the non-bag-fee airlines,
Southwest and JetBlue, to not have a comparable increase in consumer heterogeneity.
Analyzing the mix of business and leisure travelers for each airline in the time leading up
to bag fees I do not find conclusive evidence of an increase in consumer heterogeneity. The time
trend of the proxies measuring mix of consumers are inconsistent among bag fee airlines, and the
evidence actually implies Southwest and JetBlue saw an increase in consumer heterogeneity. These
findings suggest consumer heterogeneity was not the main determinant for the introduction of bag
fees in the U.S. airline industry, however, one should be cautious when interpreting the findings as
there are limitations to the data.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of Earnings Ratio
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of route-specific earnings ratios across the entire sample. The
highest accommodations to non-farm income ratio of each end-point city is recorded as a route’s earnings
ratio. The extreme values in the distribution are for flights to Las Vegas and Atlantic City.
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Figure 2.2: Ticket Price Distribution Comparison
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(a) Leisure Route: New York (LGA) to Orlando (MCO) – Delta (2006:Q1)
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(b) Big City Route: New York (LGA) to Washington, DC (DCA) – Delta (2006:Q1)
Notes: Panel (a) shows the ticket price distribution for Delta on the route LGA-MCO in the first quarter
of 2006. Panel (b) shows the ticket price distribution for Delta on the route LGA-DCA in the first quarter
of 2006. These example fare distributions illustrate the difference in price dispersion between a “Leisure”
route and a “Big-City” route. The Gini coefficient for LGA-MCO (Panel (a)) is equal to 0.236. The Gini
coefficient for LGA-DCA (Panel (b)) is equal to 0.248.
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Table 2.1: Leisure Routes
Airport City and State Earnings Ratio
ACY Atlantic City, NJ 0.22136
LAS Las Vegas, NV 0.15430
JAC Jackson, WY 0.12528
BKG Branson, MO 0.09277
EYW Key West, FL 0.08735
EGE Eagle, CO 0.06545
RNO Reno, NV 0.05718
MYR Myrtle Beach, SC 0.04414
ASE Aspen, CO 0.04072
FLG Flagstaff, AZ 0.03925
SOP Pinehurst/Southern Pines, NC 0.03657
RUT Rutland, VT 0.03023
BRD Brainerd, MN 0.02956
MCO Orlando, FL 0.02931
SFB Sanford, FL 0.02931
HDN Hayden, CO 0.02663
APF Naples, FL 0.02527
HHH Hilton Head, SC 0.02043
SAF Santa Fe, NM 0.02257
FCA Kalispell, MT 0.02257
OTH North Bend/Coos Bay, OR 0.01868
PRC Prescott, AZ 0.01867
SGU St. George, UT 0.01769
BZN Bozeman, MT 0.01746
RDM Bend/Redmond, OR 0.01716
HOT Hot Springs, AR 0.01678
DRO Durango, CO 0.01674
TVC Traverse City, MI 0.01631
SBP San Luis Obispo, CA 0.01588
SHR Sheridan, WY 0.01532
ECP, PFN Panama City, FL 0.01531
LMT Klamath Falls, OR 0.01492
SMX Santa Maria, CA 0.01486
SBA Santa Barbara, CA 0.01486
RAP Rapid City, SD 0.01482
VPS Valparaiso, FL 0.01408
CHS Charleston, SC 0.01386
AVL Asheville, NC 0.01339
RKS Rock Springs, WY 0.01253
PBI West Palm Beach/Palm Beach, FL 0.01253
FLL Fort Lauderdale, FL 0.01253
MIA Miami, FL 0.01253
RSW Fort Myers, FL 0.01241
RIW Riverton/Lander, WY 0.01183
CEC Crescent City, CA 0.01168
SAV Savannah, GA 0.01141
CIU Sault Ste. Marie, MI 0.01127
CLD Carlsbad, CA 0.01095
SAN San Diego, CA 0.01095
CDC Cedar City, UT 0.01085
DAB Daytona Beach, FL 0.01085
COS Colorado Springs, CO 0.01083
Continued on next page
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Table 2.1 – Continued from previous page
Airport City and State Earnings Ratio
TUS Tucson, AZ 0.01409
PWM Portland, ME 0.01309
SOW Show Low, AZ 0.01029
CYS Cheyenne, WY 0.01009
IFP Bullhead City, AZ 0.00979
HII Lake Havasu City, AZ 0.00979
IGM Kingman, AZ 0.00978
LAR Larmie, WY 0.00971
BTM Butte, MT 0.00961
LBF North Platte, NE 0.00931
CLM Port Angeles, WA 0.00930
STS Santa Rosa, CA 0.00927
GUP Gallup, NM 0.00894
Notes: The table lists airports with earnings ratios above the 85th percentile. Earnings ratio
is calculated by an area’s accommodation earnings over all non-farm earnings. The median
earnings ratio from 2002-2010 is the recorded value for each area. The 85th percentile earnings
ratio is calculated from the median earnings ratio of all areas. Any route with one end-point
city from the list is considered a “Leisure” route.
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Table 2.2: Big-City Routes
Airport Metropolitan Area Population Included in
Big-City Sample?
EWR, JFK, LGA New York–Newark–Jersey City 19,469,123 Yes
BUR, LAX, SNA Los Angeles–Long Beach–Anaheim 12,670216 Yes
MDW, ORD Chicago–Naperville–Elgin 9,470,335 Yes
DAL, DFW Dallas–Fort Worth–Arlington 6,081,907 Yes
PHL Philadelphia–Camden–Wilmington 5,941,539 Yes
FLL, MIA Miami–Fort Lauderdale–West Palm Beach 5,581,524 No
DCA, IAD Washington–Arlington–Alexandria 5,372,905 Yes
ATL Atlanta–Sandy Springs–Roswell 5,066,356 Yes
IAH, HOU Houston–The Woodlands–Sugar Land 5,036,393 Yes
BOS Boston–Cambridge–Newton 4,440,034 Yes
DTW Detroit–Warren–Dearborn 4,431,048 Yes
OAK, SFO San Francisco–Oakland–Hayward 4,158,544 Yes
PHX Phoenix–Mesa–Scottsdale 3,914,212 Yes
ONT Riverside–San Bernardino–Ontario 3,875,709 Yes
SEA Seattle–Tacoma–Bellevue 3,414,797 Yes
MSP Minneapolis–St. Paul–Bloomington 3,301,252 Yes
SAN San Diego–Carlsbad 3,104,182 No
STL St. Louis 2,779,404 Yes
BWI Baltimore–Columbia–Towson 2,644,231 Yes
TPA Tampa–St.Petersburg–Clearwater 2,587,771 No
DEN Denver–Aurora–Lakewood 2,374,194 Yes
PIT Pittsburgh 2,356,658 Yes
SMF Sacramento–Roseville–Arden-Arcade 2,132,657 Yes
CLE Cleveland–Elyria 2,111,699 Yes
PDX Portland–Vancouver–Hillsboro 2,103,164 Yes
CVG Cincinnati 2,020,396 Yes
CLT Charlotte–Concord–Gastonia 2,009,239 Yes
LAS Las Vegas–Henderson–Paradise 1,939,407 No
IND Indianapolis–Carmel–Anderson 1,873,460 Yes
CMH Columbus 1,865,647 Yes
MCI Kansas City 1,858,778 Yes
SAT San Antonio–New Braunfels 1,857,602 Yes
SJC San Jose–Sunnyvale–Santa Clara 1,842,462 Yes
MCO Orlando–Kissimmee–Sanford 1,760,345 No
AUS Austin–Round Rock 1,682,338 Yes
Notes: The table lists the airports located in the top 35 metropolitan areas according to population (mean population from
2002-2010). Any route with both end-point cities from the list above is considered a “Big-City” route. Areas with high earnings
ratios are excluded from the Big-City sample since those areas are more likely to have high volumes of leisure travelers and
not as much of a mix in consumer types.
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Table 2.3: Averages by Subsample
All Routes Big-City Routes Leisure Routes
All Carriers
Earnings Ratio 0.0205 0.0056 0.0481
Gini 0.2197 0.2387 0.2095
Legacy Carriers
Earnings Ratio 0.0166 0.0054 0.0420
Gini 0.2402 0.2641 0.2259
Bag Fee Low-Cost Carriers
Earnings Ratio 0.0283 0.0049 0.0557
Gini 0.1966 0.1996 0.1945
Non-Bag-Fee Low-Cost Carriers
Earnings Ratio 0.0276 0.0064 0.0567
Gini 0.1753 0.1739 0.1842
Notes: The table presents passenger weighted means for route-specific earnings ratios and Gini coefficients. The
table differentiates between all routes, Big-City routes, and Leisure routes as defined in the main text. Different
statistics are presented for various types of carriers. Bag fee carriers are listed in Table 1.3 and non-bag-fee carriers
include Southwest and JetBlue. All Legacy carriers introduced a bag fee.
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Chapter 3
Did higher marginal costs of
bag-checking services motivate
airlines to charge bag fees?
3.1 Introduction
From 2007-2009, all but two major U.S. airline carriers introduced a bag fee for the first
checked bag across all domestic flights.1 The new bag fee revenue is a clear benefit to airlines;
however, it is still unclear why airlines waited until 2007 to charge bag fees. One possible explanation
is imposing bag fees became optimal once the costs of bag-checking services were high enough. This
paper investigates whether increasing marginal costs motivated airlines to introduce bag fees by
examining trends of several costs associated with transporting passenger baggage leading up to
2007-2009.
In 2008, the Wall Street Journal estimated the average cost to an airline of transporting a
checked bag to be roughly $15 per bag.2 Although there is no data on the number of checked bags,
1The only exceptions were Southwest and JetBlue, which both continued to allow at least one free bag check with
the purchase of a flight ticket. JetBlue eventually implemented fees for the first checked bag in 2015. See Table 1.3
for bag fee introduction dates for the major U.S. airlines.
2The estimate included several key components, such as labor, equipment, compensation for mishandled bag-
gage, and fuel. “What it costs an airline to fly your luggage” by Scott McCartney, WSJ, November 2008.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122757025502954613
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data on bag fee revenue lends insight into how many bags are checked, and thus, the overall costs
of bag-checking services. For example, using the bag revenue data I estimate about 9.48 million
bags were checked on American Airlines from July 2008 to December 2008 (American Airlines
introduced first checked bag fees in June 2008).3 These estimates suggest handling checked luggage
cost American Airlines roughly $142.2 million in the second half of 2008. Other airlines over the
same time period also experienced high estimated costs of baggage handling: United (introduced
bag fees in June 2008) had estimated costs of $67.2 million; U.S. Airways (introduced bag fees in
early July 2008) had estimated costs of $134.6 million.
The substantial cost of bag-checking services suggests airlines may want to discourage pas-
sengers from checking a bag, or at least charge for the service more directly. To that point, Ben
Baldanza, the former CEO of Spirit Airlines, described bag fees as “economic incentives for customers
to behave in a way that will cost us less money.”4 This idea is also highlighted in the economic theory
of bundling/unbundling. In particular, Adams and Yellen (1976) show a firm selling two goods has
an incentive to sell the goods separately when marginal costs are relatively high for both products.5
By unbundling, the firm can more effectively deter consumers from purchasing a good for which they
have reservation prices below the cost to supply. On the other hand, when the costs of producing a
good are negligible, the firm can find it equally efficient to sell the goods as a bundle.6
For costs to be a motivation for charging bag fees, given the theory, the marginal costs of
bag-checking services must have increased prior to the introduction of bag fees. This paper explores
the trends of several key costs associated with the supply of bag-checking services, including fuel,
compensation for mishandled baggage, and the opportunity cost of cargo space. Using data from
the Bureau of Transportation Statistics and evidence from industry reports, I investigate how the
marginal costs change from 2000 to 2013.
3Data on bag fee revenue are published by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Schedule P-12.
4Source: “Interview: Spirit Airlines Chief Executive Ben Baldanza” by Ghim-Lay Yeo, Flightglobal, April 26,
2012. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/interview-spirit-airlines-chief-executive-ben-balda-371158/
5Adams and Yellen (1976) examine three possible pricing options for a monopolist selling two goods: pure compo-
nents (sell each good separately); pure bundling (sell both goods together as a bundle); and mixed bundling (sell each
good separately plus a discounted bundle option). While Adams and Yellen (1976) do not use the term “unbundling,”
going from a pure bundling strategy to a mixed bundling strategy is heavily discussed in their paper and is equivalent
to introducing an add-on fee. The only difference between the standard bundling theory in Adams and Yellen (1976)
and add-on pricing theory is one of the two goods (the add-on) is only valuable when purchased with the other good
(the base good).
6Many economist have expanded on the work of Adams and Yellen (1976). The most relevant of the extensions
for bag fees are those on add-on pricing, such as Pierce and Winter (1996), Ellison (2005), Fruchter et al. (2011),
Shulman and Geng (2013), and Brueckner et al. (2015). The add-on literature typically assumes marginal costs to
zero for simplification; however, the intuition as described in Adams and Yellen (1976) is the same in the papers which
include positive costs (see Fruchter et al. (2011) and Brueckner et al. (2015))
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I find in the years leading up to bag fees (specifically 2003-2007) that fuel prices increased
substantially, the quantity of mishandled bags skyrocketed, and cargo capacity of airlines shrank
while the revenue potential per cargo ton increased. All of these changes suggest greater marginal
costs of transporting additional baggage. Further, these findings are consistent with the story of
increasing marginal costs of bag-checking services leading to the introduction of bag fees.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the findings per-
taining to the time trend of fuel costs associated with transporting luggage. Section 3.3 presents
the findings on how the marginal cost associated with mishandled baggage has changed over time.
Section 3.4 discusses the opportunity cost of cargo space and provides evidence indicating possible
changes leading up to bag fee introductions. Section 3.5 discusses other relevant costs associated
with bag-checking services but play a smaller role in the decision to charge bag fees, such as labor
and equipment costs. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Fuel Costs of Transporting Luggage
Fuel costs account for a significant proportion of operating costs for airlines. In 2008, fuel’s
share of total operating costs for U.S. airlines was 34.2%, with the next highest single component
being labor costs at 21.5%.7 The amount of fuel an airline consumes is influenced by the weight of
the aircraft.8 A common formula used in the airline industry approximates fuel consumption to be 3
to 5 percent of the weight of an object in fuel to fly it one hour.9 A passenger’s 40 pound bag, thus,
can have an immediate impact on an airline’s operating costs. The actual marginal cost associated
to the additional weight of the bag in part depends on the current price of fuel the airline pays. The
higher the current price of fuel, the greater the impact a bag’s weight has on an airline’s operating
costs.
To examine whether fuel prices increased, and in turn, whether marginal costs of bag-
checking services increased prior to the introduction of bag fees I collect data on jet fuel spot
prices.10 Figure 3.1 plots monthly prices for jet fuel (2013 dollars). The figure shows an obvious
7“IATA Economic Briefing: Airline Fuel and Labour Cost Share,” IATA, February 2010
8Airlines are constantly looking for ways to reduce the weight of their airplanes. Replacing equipment with lighter
variants, reducing the amount of water for bathroom faucets and toilets, decreasing the number of magazines, and
even cleaning aircraft to remove dirt and debris are all examples of techniques used by airlines to reduce weight.
Source: “No speck too small as U.S. airlines search for fuel savings” by Micheline Maynard, The New York Times,
June 11, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/11/business/worldbusiness/11iht-air.1.13628276.html
9“What it costs an airline to fly your luggage” by Scott McCartney, WSJ, November 2008.
10Jet fuel spot prices come from the U.S. Energy Information Administration.
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upward trend in fuel prices over the majority of the time period. There was a sharp drop in fuel
prices between 2008-2009, but prices quickly increased soon after.
The trend in fuel prices from Figure 3.1 suggests the marginal cost of bag-checking services
increased quite substantially leading up to the introduction of bag fees (between 2007-2009). For
example, a gallon of fuel costs, on average, $1.14 in 2003 and by 2008 the price had increased to
$3.18 per gallon. Therefore, a 40 pound bag on a 3 hour flight would have cost an airline roughly
$0.80 in 2003 and $2.24 in 2008.11 Although the cost may seem relatively small, the increase is quite
significant, particularly when one takes into account the major airlines are transporting millions of
checked bags per year.
It is worth noting that the fact that all airlines (bag fee and non-bag-fee airlines) face the
same fuel prices does not necessarily contradict the story of higher marginal costs leading to bag
fees. Marginal costs are only one factor in an airlines decision to implement bag fees. An airline’s
decision to unbundle bag-checking services was likely influenced by the distribution of consumers
with regard to their willingness to pay to check a bag, as well. The growing literature on add-on
pricing emphasizes the price discrimination story, which does not rely on changes or differences
in costs among firms (Pierce and Winter (1996); Ellison (2005); Shulman and Geng (2013); Fiore
(2016)). So the fact that all airlines saw an increase in fuel prices does not discredit the cost story
this paper is focusing on, but rather suggest it is only part of the bigger picture.
As a final note, the impact of fuel costs on an airline’s decision to introduce bag fees is likely
to be small relative to other costs because of carry-on luggage. When an airline introduces a bag fee,
passengers try to transport their belongings via a carry-on instead of checking a bag.12 Carry-ons
are likely to be lighter than their checked alternative, but the difference in weight is much smaller
than compared to no bag at all. Therefore, the above analysis should be viewed more as an upper
bound on the opportunity cost of fuel associated with checked luggage.
3.3 Cost of Mishandled Baggage
Another significant cost associated with bag-checking services is the compensation passen-
gers receive from the airline when a bag is delayed or lost. SITA, an aviation communications and
11These calculations assume 4% of the bag’s weight in fuel was consumed per hour and one gallon of jet fuel is
equivalent to 6.8 pounds.
12See “Less Baggage, Big Savings to Airlines” by Christine Negroni, The New York Times, April 6, 2010, for
industry insight into the increase in carry-ons caused by bag fees.
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technology company that tracks baggage performance each year, estimated delayed or lost luggage
to passengers cost the airline an average of $100 per bag.13 In 2007, U.S. airlines reported around
4.4 million mishandled bags, which amounts to a total cost of roughly $440 million. The number
of mishandled baggage was increasing over the years leading up to 2008, which was primarily a
product of increasing passenger counts and number of bags checked.14 The mishandled baggage
costs associated with excessive amounts of checked luggage could have been an incentive for airlines
to implement bag fees and discourage passengers from checking bags.
To analyze the trend of checked and mishandled baggage, I collect data from the Air Travel
Consumer Reports published by the Department of Transportation. These data provide information
on the total bags mishandled for all the major U.S. airlines on a monthly basis. The data do not
include information on the number of checked bags; however, the number of passengers is positively
correlated to the number of bags checked. Therefore, I can analyze the ratio of mishandled bags
to number of passengers to gain insight into the quality of baggage handling for each airline. My
hypothesis is that increasing total passengers results in growing quantities of bags checked, and as a
result, the efficiency and success rate of baggage handling falls – i.e., marginal costs of bag-checking
services rises because a bag is now more likely to be mishandled.
Figure 3.2 presents the time-series of total bags mishandled and total enplaned passengers15
for all U.S. airlines from 2000 to 2013.16 Before bag fees were introduced the total bags mishandled
and number of passengers were positively correlated and consistently moved together. Between 2002
and 2007, both passengers and mishandled bags increased substantially. Alternatively, during the
aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks and the Great Recession, both passengers and
mishandled bags decreased. Once bag fees are introduced, while the positive relationship appears
to still be present for mishandled bags and passengers, the total number of mishandled bags drops
dramatically. The significant drop in mishandled bags, despite still historically high levels of passen-
gers, suggests passengers started checking fewer bags. With that being said, the drop in the number
of checked bags may have also improved the success rate of handling bags.
To get a better idea of the success rate of bag-checking services, Figure 3.3 presents the
132013 Baggage Report, SITA.
14Doug Parker, current Chairman and CEO of U.S. Airways, credits poor baggage handling results to excessive
amounts of checked luggage. U.S. Airways’ baggage handling improved after the airline introduced bag fees, which is
largely because fewer passengers were checking bags. Source: “US airlines will generate millions from higher baggage
fees” IdeaWorks, January 20, 2010.
15An enplaned passenger is one who actually boards the plane at the airport.
16Data are aggregated to the year to clearly show the trends over time by eliminating seasonal variation that would
be apparent at the quarter or month level.
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number of mishandled bags per 1,000 passengers over time. In 2003, bag fee introducing airline’s
were mishandling 3.7 bags for every 1,000 passengers; however, by 2007, they were mishandling 6.5
bags per 1,000 passengers. This significant increase in the number of bags mishandled could explain
the move to unbundle bag-checking services. In 2012, bag fee airlines reported mishandling only
2.6 bags per 1,000 passengers, despite the total number of enplaned passengers remaining relatively
high.
Since there is no indication that the increase in passengers prior to the introduction of bag
fees resulted in more checked bags per person, my hypothesis is that the higher ratio of mishandled
bags to passengers is a product of lower quality baggage handling. In other words, as the quantity
of checked bags increases, the probability of a bag being mishandled, and thus, the marginal cost
of providing bag-checking services, goes up. In support of this, Catherine Mayer, a current vice
president at SITA, described the excessive amounts of checked luggage as very costly to the airlines
because of their capacity constraints. By introducing bag fees and discouraging checked luggage,
“There’s less strain on the airline, less handling costs,” Catherine Mayer notes in an interview with
the New York Times.17 There are several other reasons for the improvement in baggage handling,
such as relaxed carry-on policies, fewer flights, and improved baggage handling equipment in some
airports; however, airlines credit bag fees and the drop in checked bags as the primary cause for the
decrease in mishandled baggage.18
As a final note on mishandled baggage, Figure 3.3 indicates the non-bag-fee airlines, JetBlue
and Southwest, saw similar trends in mishandled baggage. Not only did JetBlue and Southwest
have a significant increase in mishandled bags per passenger prior to 2008, but they also saw the
historically low mishandled rates after the other airlines introduced bag fees. The likely reason for
these similarities is the impact bag fees had on consumer behavior was widespread and could have
spilled over into non-bag-fee airlines’ consumer base. In other words, many passengers probably
switched to carry-ons due to the fear of being charged and continued to use carry-on luggage even
when flying Southwest or JetBlue. I still expect Southwest and JetBlue to have higher mishandled
rates, since they likely transport more bags, which is supported by later years of the time-series in
Figure 3.3.
17“Less Baggage, Big Savings to Airlines” by Christine Negroni, The New York Times, April 6, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/business/07bags.html
18Source: 2010 Baggage Report, SITA.
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3.4 Opportunity Cost of Cargo Space
Another important component of bag-checking costs is the opportunity cost associated with
the cargo space in the belly of the aircraft. Non-passenger related freight is a significant revenue
option for passenger airlines. Ulrich Ogiermann, current Chairman of the International Air Cargo
Association, described freight as a revenue potential that “cannot be ignored” in an interview with
the New York Times.19 From 2003 to 2010, air cargo generally amounts to $500 million a year for
the top legacy carriers, which is equivalent to about 20% of transport related revenue20 for most
years (see Table 3.1).
A passenger airline’s potential cargo revenue is constrained by the availability of space in
the belly of the aircraft and any weight limitations; thus, checked luggage can at times restrict an
airline’s ability to transport freight. Introducing bag fees will lower the number of checked bags and
free up space for other freight. How much the airline benefits from freeing up space depends on the
increase in revenues from the substitute cargo. Therefore, an increase in the marginal revenue of
freight would be an incentive for airlines to introduce bag fees.
To investigate changes in the marginal revenue of air cargo and determine if it increased
prior to the introduction of bag fees, I collect data on cargo totals and revenues from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.21 These data contain information on the total tons of cargo,22 revenue ton miles
of cargo,23 and total dollar revenues from cargo for each airline carrier (quarterly). Further, these
data include information on both passenger service airlines and cargo-only service airlines. I also
use data on available passenger seats in order to control for the number and size of aircrafts utilized
by the passenger service airlines.24
To get an idea of how air cargo totals have changed over the years, Figure 3.4 plots both
total cargo for all service types (passenger and cargo) and the fraction of cargo transported on
passenger flights. There was a sharp decline in air cargo between 2003 and 2009 (20% reduction),
19“Less Baggage, Big Savings to Airlines” by Christine Negroni, The New York Times, April 6, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/business/07bags.html
20Transport related revenue is from services which grow from and are incidental to the air transportation services
performed by a passenger carrier, such as in-flight sales, code share revenues, and revenues from associated businesses
(e.g., aircraft maintenance, restaurants, etc.). Transport related revenues contribute significantly to the profits for the
top four legacy carriers, American, Delta, United, and U.S. Airways, producing around $4 billion a year per carrier.
21Cargo totals were obtained from Schedule T-1, while revenues were recovered from Schedule P-12.
22Cargo includes both freight and mail, which I will sometimes refer to as freight even though mail is always
included.
23Revenue ton miles is calculated by multiplying weight by the number of miles transported. So cargo revenue ton
miles gives the tons of freight transported one mile.
24These data are from Bureau of Transportation Statistics, T-100 Domestic Segment.
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and a significant drop in the fraction of the cargo moved by passenger flights (40% reduction). An
similar trend is found when controlling for miles flown shown in Figure 3.5.
Increases in fuel prices and the economic downturn in 2008 were the main causes of the fall
in air cargo.25 Fuel prices also explain some of the drop in passenger service cargo. Passenger service
primarily competes with cargo service by offering lower rates that are mostly based on fuel prices.
A cargo service sets their prices based on the full operating costs of flying the aircraft since they
are not already transporting passengers. Therefore, higher fuel prices help to close the gap between
passenger and cargo service freight rates.
The decrease in passenger flight cargo is also a product of the reduction in flights by the
bigger passenger airlines (American, United, Delta, U.S. Airways). Although, even with the consol-
idation in the industry, the airlines still saw a drop in cargo per available seat (see Figures 3.6 and
3.7).26 Competition from cargo airlines and the negative shock to demand can again explain the
decrease in cargo per available seat. In the early 2000s there was significant entry by cargo service
airlines, in particular, new express services.27 In general, cargo airlines are able to compete with
passenger services’ lower rates because they provide more predictable service and can offer faster
delivery. Passenger airlines may have introduced bag fees in order to have less uncertainty on the
cargo space, particularly if they offer discounted prices for checking in ahead of time online.
There is clearly a trend of passenger airlines shipping less cargo in terms of weight; however,
the return on cargo per ton has been increasing. Figure 3.8 plots the average dollars earned per
revenue ton mile for cargo on passenger flights.28 Converting tons to pounds, the data suggest it
costs $0.41, on average, to ship one pound of cargo on a 3-hour passenger flight (approximately 1,500
miles) in 2003. By 2007, shipping one pound on a 3-hour passenger flight cost roughly $0.62, on
average.29 The increase is quite significant when an airline is allowing any passenger who purchases
a flight ticket to check a bag of up to 50 pounds at no additional charge. A 50 pound bag would go
25“World Air Cargo Forecast” Boeing, 2014. http://www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/commercial/about-
our-market/cargo-market-detail-wacf/download-report/assets/pdfs/wacf.pdf
26Southwest and JetBlue were actually increasing their capacity, in contrast to the Legacy carriers. Southwest and
JetBlue saw decreases in cargo and cargo per available seat miles as well.
27“Air Freight: A market study with implications for landlocked countries” The World Bank Group, Au-
gust, 2009. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAIRTRANSPORT/Resources/515180-1262792532589/6683177-
1268747346047/air cargo study.pdf
28Northwest cargo and earnings were not used in Figure 3.8 because there appears to be irregularities in their
financial reports – most likely a product of their merger with Delta in 2008.
29These estimates are consistent with an interview on NPR with a restaurant which pays about a dollar a pound to
ship fresh seafood on passenger airlines. “Tired of paying for checked baggage? You’re actually getting a good
deal” NPR, February 19, 2015. http://www.npr.org/2015/01/21/378905601/tired-of-paying-for-checked-baggage-
youre-actually-getting-a-good-deal
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for $20.50 in 2003 and $31.00 in 2007 if shipped as normal freight.30
The higher per unit return on freight increases the potential opportunity cost of transporting
passenger baggage, but the question remains as to how often checked luggage actually uses cargo
space that would otherwise be used for freight. The data do not have information on cargo capacity,
so there is no way to calculate freight load factors; however, there are a couple reasons to believe
cargo space is shrinking. First, there has been a significant reduction in the number of passenger
flights for the top airlines. And second, the number of passengers was rising substantially prior to
bag fees, which also caused increases in the number of bags checked.31 These two facts create less
space for cargo. With that being said, demand for air cargo has also shrunk, so there is no conclusive
evidence as to the trend in cargo space availability.
3.5 Other Costs of Bag-Checking Services
The remaining components of bag-checking costs for airlines are labor and equipment re-
lated. Each airline hires their own baggage handlers at all of their airports. Beyond the wages these
employees earn, a relevant cost to baggage handling is compensation for injuries. As for equipment,
airlines rent or buy airport space, conveyors, carousels, vehicles, scanning equipment, etc. at ev-
ery airport. In total, both labor and equipment costs significantly impact airlines’ operating costs.
For example, Douglas Parker, the former CEO of U.S. Airways, said U.S. Airways spent over $250
million on baggage handlers in 2008 (roughly 11% of the airline’s payroll).
Despite their significance towards total costs, labor and equipment costs are unlikely to be
a major factor in the decision to implement bag fees. Both of these costs are more reflective of fixed
costs as opposed to marginal costs, and thus, charging a bag fee to drop bag quantities will have
less of an impact on labor and equipment costs. Nonetheless, it is possible that reducing checked
luggage through bag fees could reduce some strain put on the labor and equipment of an airline.
For the workers, fewer bags could mean fewer injuries to the baggage handlers.32 Fewer
30The increase in the return to cargo shown in Figure 3.8 is probably a result of a few events.
Higher fuel prices will obviously increase the rates airlines charge for air cargo. In addition, air
cargo has shifted towards lighter weight, more valuable goods, such as electronics. Source: “Air
Freight: A market study with implications for landlocked countries” The World Bank Group, Au-
gust, 2009. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAIRTRANSPORT/Resources/515180-1262792532589/6683177-
1268747346047/air cargo study.pdf
31Again, there is no data on the number of bags checked, but reports and interviews have stated this trend, which
has been discussed throughout this paper.
32“Less Baggage, Big Savings to Airlines” by Christine Negroni, The New York Times, April 6, 2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/07/business/07bags.html
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bags could also allow airlines to hire fewer workers when employees turnover. I do not have data on
baggage handling employees and salaries, so I am not able to evaluate the trends in these factors.
With that being said, it is unlikely these costs would be significantly affected by bag fees – an airline
has to invest in equipment and labor for baggage handling as long as even a small amount of bags
are being checked.
3.6 Further Discussion and Conclusions
This paper presents analyses for the most relevant costs of bag-checking services leading up
to and immediately following the widespread introduction of bag fees in the U.S. airline industry.
The evidence suggests the marginal costs of transporting passengers’ checked baggage increased prior
to the introduction of bag fees. The changes in costs were spread across three main components:
fuel, mishandled baggage, and cargo space. The cost of fuel to transport a passenger’s bag increased
by over 200% between 2003 and 2008. The success-rate of baggage handling dropped dramatically
over the same time period. The revenue per pound for air cargo, representing potential opportunity
cost of a checked bag, increased by roughly 50%.
Increasing marginal cost leading up to the time airlines introduced bag fees supports the
economic theory on add-on pricing that suggests bag fees should be charged once the costs of
bag-checking services is sufficiently high. This intuition is closely related to the standard price
discrimination story of add-on fees, where the firm can use an add-on fee to sort consumers based on
their willingness to pay for the add-on. The cost story presented in this paper is part of the larger
picture and fits with the price discrimination story.
Further, while the findings of increasing marginal costs are convincing, I did not find any
substantial evidence of a difference in marginal costs between bag-fee-introducing airlines and non-
bag-fee airlines, Southwest and JetBlue. But again, costs are only a part of the larger story, so the
fact that Southwest and JetBlue also witnessed increases in costs but did not introduce bag fees
does not discredit the conclusions of this paper. If anything, the results of this paper suggest costs
likely played a significant part in the move to bag fees, but further research is needed to uncover the
full answer.
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Figure 3.1: Jet Fuel Spot Price
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Notes: The figure shows monthly per gallon jet fuel spot prices from 2000 to 2013. Dollar amounts are
adjusted for inflation, so the price is in terms of 2013 dollars. The data were collected from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration.
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Figure 3.2: Total Bags Mishandled and Enplaned Passengers (All U.S. airlines)
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Notes: The figure shows industry totals for both mishandled bags (left-hand axis) and enplaned passengers
(right-hand axis) collected from Air Travel Consumer Reports published by the Department of Transporta-
tion. A mishandled bag is one that has been reported as delayed in arriving to the destination or lost. A
enplaned passenger is a passenger who boarded the flight. The two vertical lines represent the time range
when all airlines introduced bag fees (with the exceptions of JetBlue and Southwest). Only airlines that
report mishandled baggage data are included in the sample. The airlines included are American, Delta,
United, U.S. Airways, Alaska, Continental, Northwest, AirTran, Frontier, Virgin America, Southwest, and
JetBlue. The data were collected from the Department of Transportation, Air Travel Consumer Reports.
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Figure 3.3: Mishandled Bags per Enplaned Passengers (Bag Fee vs Non-Bag-Fee Airlines)
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Notes: The figure plots mishandled bags per 1,000 passengers while differentiating between bag fee charging
airlines and non-bag-fee charging airlines. Note that bag fee airlines are ones that eventually introduce a
bag fee. A mishandled bag is one that has been reported as delayed in arriving to the destination or lost. A
enplaned passenger is a passenger who boarded the flight. The bag fee airlines are American, Delta, United,
U.S. Airways, Continental, Alaska, Northwest, Frontier AirTran, and Virgin America. The two vertical lines
represent the time range when all airlines introduced bag fees (with the exceptions of JetBlue and Southwest).
Southwest and JetBlue are the only non-bag-fee airlines. Trends are similar across each airlines, so airlines
are grouped together instead of graphing each individually. The data were collected from the Department of
Transportation, Air Travel Consumer Reports.
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Figure 3.4: Total Cargo in Weight and Fraction on Passenger Service
Bag Fees Introduced
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Notes: The figure shows industry totals for air cargo (left-hand axis) and the fraction of total cargo trans-
ported by passenger service flights (right-hand axis). Total cargo includes all passenger service and cargo
service flights. Cargo includes both freight and mail. The two vertical lines represent the time range when
all Legacy carriers introduced bag fees. Legacy carriers, Southwest, and JetBlue are the relevant passenger
airlines for the analysis of cargo due to their significant cargo services. Other Low-Cost carriers provide
relatively few cargo services, and thus, are not as impacted by changes in demand or costs associated with
air cargo. The data were collected from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Schedule T-1.
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Figure 3.5: Total Cargo Revenue Ton Miles and Fraction on Passenger Service
Bag Fees Introduced
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Notes: The figure shows industry totals for air cargo revenue ton miles (left-hand side) and the fraction of
total cargo revenue ton miles transported by passenger service flights (right-hand side). A cargo revenue
ton mile is one ton of cargo that is transported one mile. Total cargo RTM includes all passenger service
and cargo service flights. Cargo includes both freight and mail. The two vertical lines represent the time
range when all Legacy carriers introduced bag fees. Legacy carriers, Southwest, and JetBlue are the relevant
passenger airlines for the analysis of cargo due to their significant cargo services. Other Low-Cost carriers
provide relatively few cargo services, and thus, are not as impacted by changes in demand or costs associated
with air cargo. The data were collected from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Schedule T-1.
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Figure 3.6: Cargo per Available Seat – Legacy Carriers
Bag Fees Introduced
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Notes: The figure shows cargo pounds per available seat and total available seats for Legacy carriers. All
Legacy carriers see a similar trend, so data is aggregated as opposed to plotting out each carrier separately.
An available seat is one passenger seat, regardless of whether it was purchased. Cargo includes both freight
and mail. Legacy carriers include American, Delta, United, U.S. Airways, Continental, Northwest, Alaska,
and Midwest. The two vertical lines represent the time range when all Legacy carriers introduced bag fees.
The data were collected from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, T-100 Domestic Segment.
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Figure 3.7: Cargo per Available Seat – Southwest and JetBlue
Bag Fees Introduced
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Notes: The figure shows cargo pounds per available seat and total available seats for Southwest and JetBlue
(combined). An available seat is one passenger seat, regardless of whether it was purchased. Cargo includes
both freight and mail. The two vertical lines represent the time range when all Legacy carriers introduced
bag fees. The data were collected from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, T-100 Domestic Segment.
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Figure 3.8: Average Unit Revenue for U.S. Airline Cargo – Passenger Service
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Notes: The figure shows average dollars earned per cargo revenue ton mile for all major airlines. The
statistic is calculated by dividing total operating revenue from cargo (both freight and mail) by total cargo
revenue ton miles. A cargo revenue ton mile is one ton of cargo that is transported one mile. Financial data
were collected from Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Schedule P-12, and cargo data were collected from
Schedule T-1. Airlines included are American, Delta, United, U.S. Airways, Midwest, Alaska, Continental,
Southwest, and JetBlue. Other Low-Cost carriers are not included because air cargo is negligibly small part
of their operations. Northwest is not included do to what appears to be reporting errors in the financial data
(probably due to their merger with Delta in 2008). Dollar amounts are adjusted for inflation, so the cost of
fuel is in terms of 2013 dollars.
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Table 3.1: Cargo Revenue as Percentage of Transport Related Revenue for Select Airlines
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
American 22.12 20.89 18.53 22.62 22.04 24.15 29.26 24.48
Delta 40.40 20.81 14.00 11.43 10.41 13.41 20.16 18.75
United 29.50 22.70 16.88 16.10 17.88 21.38 18.43 14.74
U.S. Airways 8.31 9.09 5.24 4.38 3.98 7.89 15.81 13.20
Notes: The table presents cargo revenue as a percentage of transport related revenue. Transport related revenue is from services
which grow from and are incidental to the air transportation services performed by a passenger carrier, such as in-flight sales, code
share revenues, and revenues from associated business (e.g., aircraft maintenance, restaurants, etc.). Transport related revenues
contribute significantly to the profits for the top four legacy carriers over this time period, producing around $4 billion a year per
carrier.
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Appendix
A.1 Derivation of Equilibrium Prices with Unaware Con-
sumers
Using the same approach as in the main specification of the model, I derive prices across
the three possible scenarios but now allow for a fraction α of boundedly rational consumers.
A.1.1 Neither carrier has a bag fee
The addition of boundedly rational consumers does not have an effect on prices when neither
carrier has a bag fee. Thus, equilibrium prices are still
pnofees1 = p
nofees
2 = t+ cH . (3.1)
A.1.2 Asymmetric Bag Fee Policies - carrier 1 has a bag fee; carrier 2
does not
For the asymmetric scenario, assume carrier 1 has a bag fee while carrier 2 does not. The
knowledgeable consumers go through the same decision process as described in the main text, but
since boundedly rational consumers do not take into account bag fees, their decision process is
comparable to when neither carrier has a bag fee. Thus, the marginal boundedly rational consumer
satisfies
I − p1 − t|0− x∗| = I − p2 − t|1− x∗|, (3.2)
and is located at x∗ ≡ 12 + p2−p12t .
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The aggregate demands for each product are
q1L =(1− α)
∫ θ∗
0
(
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
− θ(vH − vL)
2t
)
dθ (3.3)
q1H =(1− α)
∫ 1
θ∗
(
1
2
+
p2 − p1 − Fee
2t
)
dθ + α
(
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
)
(3.4)
q2H =(1− α)
∫ θ∗
0
(
1
2
+
p1 − p2
2t
+
θ(vH − vL)
2t
)
dθ (3.5)
+ (1− α)
∫ 1
θ∗
(
1
2
+
p1 + Fee− p2
2t
+
)
dθ + α
(
1
2
+
p1 − p2
2t
)
.
Substituting FeevH−vL for θ
∗, equilibrium prices are
pasym1 = t+ cH − Fee+
αFee
3
+ (1− α)
(
5Fee− 4(cH − cL)
6(vH − vL)
)
Fee (3.6)
pasym2 = t+ cH −
αFee
3
+ (1− α)
(
Fee− 2(cH − cL)
6(vH − vL)
)
Fee. (3.7)
A.1.3 Both carriers have a bag fee
Finally, assume both carriers charge a bag fee. Including boundedly rational consumers
changes carriers’ profit maximization simply because a fraction α of consumers check a bag (and
pay the bag fee) regardless of the size of the bag fee. Firm profits are now
pi1 =(1− α)(p1 + Fee− cH)(1− θ∗)
(
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
)
+ (1− α)(p1 − cL)θ∗
(
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
)
+ α(p1 + Fee− cH)
(
1
2
+
p2 − p1
2t
) (3.8)
pi2 =(1− α)(p2 + Fee− cH)(1− θ∗)
(
1
2
+
p1 − p2
2t
)
+ (1− α)(p2 − cL)θ∗
(
1
2
+
p1 − p2
2t
)
+ α(p2 + Fee− cH)
(
1
2
+
p1 − p2
2t
)
.
(3.9)
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After substituting FeevH−vL for θ
∗, equilibrium prices are
psym1 = p
sym
2 = t+ cH − Fee+ (1− α)
(
Fee− (cH − cL)
vH − vL
)
Fee. (3.10)
A.2 Construction of Competition Variables
In order to be counted as a nonstop competitor, an airline must fly at least 120 passengers
nonstop in the market during the quarter.33 Nonstop competition is further distinguished between
legacy carriers, non-Southwest LCCs (denoted as just LCCs from here on), and Southwest. Since
multiple legacy carriers may provide nonstop service to a market, several variables are constructed
to account for additional legacy competitors. These measures count the number of legacy carriers
which serve the market nonstop (nleg ns comp) and are defined by the following: leg ns comp1 = 1
if nleg ns comp ≥ 1 and equals 0 otherwise; leg ns comp2 = 2 if nleg ns comp ≥ 2 and equals 0
otherwise; leg ns comp3 = 1 if nleg ns comp ≥ 3. Variables for nonstop competition from LCCs
and Southwest are more straightforward, with a dummy variable for whether or not there is a LCC
competitor (otherlcc ns),34 and a dummy variable for whether or not Southwest has nonstop service
(WN ns).35
For an airline to be considered a connecting competitor its connecting service must ac-
count for 10% of the passengers in the market for that quarter. To measure connecting competi-
tion from legacy carriers, nleg conn comp counts the number of legacy carriers which do not serve
the market nonstop but do offer connecting service. Several variables are then constructed from
this count in the following way: leg conn comp1 = 1 if nleg conn comp ≥ 1 and equals 0 other-
wise; leg conn comp2 = 2 if nleg conn comp ≥ 2 and equals 0 otherwise; leg conn comp3 = 1 if
nleg conn comp ≥ 3; leg conn comp4 = 1 if nleg conn comp ≥ 4. Connecting competition from
LCCs and Southwest are identified by dummy variables, similar in construction to their nonstop
counterparts. Variable otherlcc conn equals 1 if an LCC provides connecting service while not pro-
33Utilizing OAG scheduling data, Brueckner et al. (2015) requires a carrier average at least 1 roundtrip each
weekday over a quarter in a market to be considered a nonstop competitor. Since I could not obtain access to the
OAG scheduling data, I could not use the same technique. In an attempt to replicate this requirement, I found a
cutoff of 120 passengers (in the DB1B data) provided similar summary statistics and regression results to Brueckner
et al. (2015).
34Most markets have at most one LCC, so it is not necessary to have additional count variables.
35If the airline is a non-Southwest LCC, otherlcc ns = 1 only if another non-Southwest LCC provides nonstop
service to the market. For Southwest, WN ns will always equal 0. These distinctions are present in the yet to be
defined LCC and Southwest competition variables, as well.
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viding nonstop service, otherwise it equals 0. Variable WN conn equals 1 if Southwest provides
connecting service but does not provide nonstop service, otherwise it equals 0.
Similar variables are constructed to account for adjacent competition. If an airline provides
nonstop service to a market but only through an adjacent airport, the airline will be counted as an
adjacent competitor.36 A list of adjacent airports can be found in the Appendix. This competition
measure differentiates between carrier types, lending variables for legacy competition (nleg adj ns),
LCC competition (otherlcc adj ns), and Southwest competition (WN adj ns). These variables
are constructed in the same way as the competition variables above, but with regards to adjacent
competition.37. Furthermore, variables measuring adjacent connecting competition are constructed
in the same manner and included in the analysis (nleg adj conn; otherlcc adj conn; WN adj conn).
The last set of competition variables control for potential competition. For an airline to
count as a potential competitor to a market, the airline must provide nonstop service to at least 5
markets at each end-point airport without serving the market itself. Potential competition is only
calculated for LCCs and Southwest, as well as for regular and adjacent competition. This amounts
to two variables for potential LCC competition (otherlcc pot and otherlcc adj pot) and two variables
for potential Southwest competition (WN pot and WN adj pot). Potential connecting competition
is not accounted for in my analysis.
Table A.1 presents summary statistics for the competition variables in both the non-weighted
and weighted sample.
A.3 Coefficient Estimates for Competition and Market Con-
trols
Coefficient estimates for control variables excluded from Tables 1.4-1.9 are reported in Tables
A.2-A.7. As expected, additional competition from legacy and low-cost carriers decreases average
fares. Southwest competition has a relatively large, negative effect on average fares.38 In all the
regressions, most of the competition variables are statistically significant, while some of the market
36For example, if Delta provides nonstop service from New York to Atlanta by the market JFK - ATL and does not
offer nonstop flights from EWR - ATL, Delta would be considered a nonstop adjacent competitor for airlines servicing
EWR - ATL (with EWR and JFK being adjacent airports).
37Adjacent legacy competition is only measured by one count variable, as opposed to several dummies
38Brueckner et al. (2013) and Brueckner et al. (2015) find a larger impact from Southwest competition. The smaller
effect found in this paper is primarily due to the inclusion of market fixed effects, which are not included in the
analysis for either Brueckner et al. (2013) or Brueckner et al. (2015).
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variables are weaker because of the inclusion of market fixed effects. Distance and whether the flight
has a connection are still estimated to have a significant impact on ticket prices in the presence
of fixed effects. See Brueckner et al. (2013) for a more in-depth discussion of the competition and
market control variables.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics - Competition Variables
Not Weighted Passenger Weighted
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
nleg ns comp 0.410 0.699 0.993 0.991
nleg conn comp 1.564 1.307 0.491 0.982
WN ns 0.079 0.271 0.114 0.317
WN conn 0.158 0.364 0.055 0.229
otherlcc ns 0.075 0.264 0.180 0.384
otherlcc conn 0.097 0.296 0.034 0.180
nleg adj ns 0.187 0.559 0.501 0.878
nleg adj conn 0.220 0.599 0.302 0.704
WN adj ns 0.059 0.235 0.132 0.339
WN adj conn 0.036 0.187 0.047 0.211
otherlcc adj ns 0.049 0.216 0.132 0.339
otherlcc adj conn 0.050 0.218 0.073 0.260
WN pot 0.093 0.290 0.051 0.219
WN adj pot 0.113 0.317 0.067 0.250
otherlcc pt 0.001 0.032 0.002 0.047
otherlcc adj pot 0.002 0.040 0.002 0.050
Number of Observations: 483,496
Number of Passengers: 126,142,178
Notes: The table presents means and standard deviations for the competition variables. The first two columns
present non-weighted means and standard deviations, while the last two columns present these statistics when
calculated with passenger weights.
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Table A.2: Competition and Market Variables for the Basic Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
weighted weighted
leg ns comp1 -0.0586*** -0.0599*** -0.0563*** -0.0611***
(0.0040) (0.0053) (0.0040) (0.0052)
leg ns comp2 -0.0483*** -0.0357*** -0.0487*** -0.0354***
(0.0070) (0.0090) (0.0070) (0.0090)
leg ns comp3 -0.0446** -0.1525*** -0.0448** -0.1517***
(0.0210) (0.0380) (0.0209) (0.0380)
leg connect comp1 0.0213*** 0.0436*** 0.0203*** 0.0418***
(0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0025) (0.0035)
leg connect comp2 -0.0085*** 0.0030 -0.0076*** 0.0034
(0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0026)
leg connect comp3 -0.0053*** 0.0060** -0.0053*** 0.0061**
(0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0026)
leg connect comp4m -0.0009 0.0114*** -0.0012 0.0112***
(0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0038)
WN ns -0.0520*** -0.1230*** -0.0616*** -0.1285***
(0.0057) (0.0112) (0.0058) (0.0112)
otherlcc ns -0.0433*** -0.0946*** -0.0436*** -0.0953***
(0.0056) (0.0087) (0.0055) (0.0087)
WN conn -0.0320*** -0.0505*** -0.0396*** -0.0556***
(0.0046) (0.0079) (0.0046) (0.0079)
otherlcc conn -0.0211*** 0.0015 -0.0213*** 0.0009
(0.0028) (0.0047) (0.0028) (0.0047)
WN adj ns 0.0323*** -0.0343* 0.0327*** -0.0340*
(0.0091) (0.0199) (0.0091) (0.0200)
otherlcc adj ns -0.0311*** -0.0114 -0.0308*** -0.0108
(0.0074) (0.0093) (0.0075) (0.0094)
ln(distance) 0.3327*** 0.1587*** 0.3324*** 0.1584***
(0.0084) (0.0130) (0.0084) (0.0130)
connect -0.0210*** 0.0225*** -0.0209*** 0.0225***
(0.0026) (0.0040) (0.0026) (0.0040)
population 0.0815*** 0.0058 0.0783*** 0.0125
(0.0293) (0.0456) (0.0296) (0.0456)
real income -0.0014 -0.0053 -0.0015 -0.0055
(0.0023) (0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0036)
earnings ratio -0.0272 -0.1325 -0.1631 -0.1470
(0.3518) (0.4870) (0.3504) (0.4865)
nleg adj ns -0.0283*** 0.0052 -0.0282*** 0.0053
(0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0049) (0.0051)
WN pot -0.0179** 0.0055 -0.0198** 0.0045
(0.0080) (0.0128) (0.0080) (0.0129)
otherlcc pot 0.0261 0.0439** 0.0275 0.0438**
(0.0209) (0.0192) (0.0213) (0.0191)
WN adj pot -0.0008 -0.0379*** -0.0011 -0.0382***
(0.0079) (0.0132) (0.0079) (0.0132)
otherlcc adj pot -0.0299* -0.0409* -0.0287* -0.0401*
(0.0170) (0.0215) (0.0172) (0.0215)
nleg adj connect -0.0002 0.0088*** -0.0006 0.0087***
(0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0018) (0.0030)
WN adj connect 0.0197*** 0.0016 0.0203*** 0.0017
(0.0064) (0.0083) (0.0065) (0.0084)
otherlcc adj connect -0.0069 0.0197*** -0.0064 0.0201***
(0.0048) (0.0076) (0.0048) (0.0076)
constant 2.9610*** 4.2913*** 2.9760*** 4.2730***
(0.1021) (0.2289) (0.1029) (0.2296)
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates for the additional competition and market variables used in the
basic regressions. The columns match those in Table 1.4.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.3: Competition and Market Variables for the Regressions with Inter-
actions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
weighted weighted
leg ns comp1 -0.0585*** -0.0602*** -0.0600*** -0.0625***
(0.0040) (0.0052) (0.0040) (0.0053)
leg ns comp2 -0.0481*** -0.0352*** -0.0480*** -0.0372***
(0.0070) (0.0089) (0.0070) (0.0087)
leg ns comp3 -0.0445** -0.1515*** -0.0448** -0.1478***
(0.0210) (0.0378) (0.0211) (0.0358)
leg connect comp1 0.0212*** 0.0433*** 0.0209*** 0.0450***
(0.0026) (0.0036) (0.0026) (0.0036)
leg connect comp2 -0.0085*** 0.0031 -0.0083*** 0.0036
(0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0019) (0.0026)
leg connect comp3 -0.0054*** 0.0059** -0.0055*** 0.0066***
(0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0020) (0.0025)
leg connect comp4m -0.0009 0.0113*** -0.0014 0.0124***
(0.0033) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0037)
WN ns -0.0516*** -0.1217*** -0.0525*** -0.1205***
(0.0057) (0.0110) (0.0057) (0.0117)
otherlcc ns -0.0436*** -0.0947*** -0.0445*** -0.0948***
(0.0056) (0.0086) (0.0056) (0.0086)
WN conn -0.0319*** -0.0506*** -0.0313*** -0.0511***
(0.0046) (0.0079) (0.0046) (0.0080)
otherlcc conn -0.0214*** 0.0010 -0.0211*** 0.0029
(0.0028) (0.0047) (0.0028) (0.0047)
WN adj ns 0.0321*** -0.0337* 0.0317*** -0.0356*
(0.0091) (0.0199) (0.0091) (0.0199)
otherlcc adj ns -0.0308*** -0.0112 -0.0320*** -0.0121
(0.0074) (0.0093) (0.0074) (0.0093)
ln(distance) 0.3328*** 0.1592*** 0.3399*** 0.1679***
(0.0084) (0.0130) (0.0086) (0.0133)
connect -0.0211*** 0.0226*** -0.0212*** 0.0237***
(0.0026) (0.0040) (0.0026) (0.0039)
population 0.0861*** 0.0096 0.0927*** -0.0002
(0.0293) (0.0454) (0.0292) (0.0439)
real income -0.0008 -0.0049 -0.0025 -0.0052
(0.0023) (0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0035)
earnings ratio 0.0031 0.1779 0.0111 0.0338
(0.3508) (0.4870) (0.3508) (0.4928)
nleg adj ns -0.0283*** 0.0052 -0.0285*** 0.0051
(0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0051)
WN pot -0.0179** 0.0052 -0.0167** 0.0072
(0.0080) (0.0129) (0.0080) (0.0131)
otherlcc pot 0.0269 0.0430** 0.0250 0.0381*
(0.0209) (0.0182) (0.0214) (0.0204)
WN adj pot -0.0008 -0.0375*** -0.0014 -0.0396***
(0.0079) (0.0132) (0.0079) (0.0132)
otherlcc adj pot -0.0298* -0.0395* -0.0290* -0.0377*
(0.0170) (0.0213) (0.0174) (0.0224)
nleg adj connect -0.0003 0.0087*** -0.0002 0.0088***
(0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0018) (0.0030)
WN adj connect 0.0195*** 0.0013 0.0206*** 0.0026
(0.0065) (0.0084) (0.0065) (0.0083)
otherlcc adj connect -0.0069 0.0199*** -0.0068 0.0200***
(0.0048) (0.0076) (0.0048) (0.0074)
constant 2.9421*** 4.2560*** 2.8959*** 4.2443***
(0.1020) (0.2288) (0.1024) (0.2244)
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates for the additional competition and market variables used in the
regressions with interactions. The columns match those in Table 1.5.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.4: Competition and Market Variables for Nonstop vs Connecting Competition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lreal fare lreal fare lreal fare lreal fare lreal fare lreal fare
leg ns comp1 -0.0614*** -0.0583*** 0.0373*** -0.0134** -0.0945*** -0.1105***
(0.0042) (0.0054) (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0054) (0.0071)
leg ns comp2 -0.0466*** -0.0352*** 0.0216** -0.0125 -0.0893*** -0.0729***
(0.0070) (0.0089) (0.0096) (0.0112) (0.0094) (0.0087)
leg ns comp3 -0.0417** -0.1521*** -0.0266 -0.1616*** -0.1044*** -0.1135***
(0.0209) (0.0377) (0.0490) (0.0343) (0.0225) (0.0160)
leg connect comp1 0.0280*** 0.0568*** 0.0966*** 0.0653*** 0.0128*** 0.0204***
(0.0028) (0.0039) (0.0060) (0.0062) (0.0030) (0.0029)
leg connect comp2 -0.0099*** 0.0023 0.0234*** 0.0399*** -0.0086*** -0.0062***
(0.0019) (0.0026) (0.0058) (0.0085) (0.0020) (0.0017)
leg connect comp3 -0.0062*** 0.0057** 0.0163** 0.0272** -0.0052*** -0.0033
(0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0083) (0.0106) (0.0020) (0.0021)
leg connect comp4m -0.0020 0.0114*** -0.0197 0.0087 0.0021 0.0009
(0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0126) (0.0225) (0.0033) (0.0033)
WN ns -0.0540*** -0.1227*** -0.0857*** -0.1613*** -0.0633*** -0.0564***
(0.0058) (0.0114) (0.0116) (0.0178) (0.0060) (0.0058)
otherlcc ns -0.0447*** -0.0932*** -0.0481*** -0.1015*** -0.0660*** -0.0510***
(0.0055) (0.0088) (0.0099) (0.0128) (0.0066) (0.0057)
WN conn -0.0286*** -0.0495*** -0.0549*** -0.0259** -0.0188*** -0.0145***
(0.0046) (0.0076) (0.0105) (0.0118) (0.0044) (0.0044)
otherlcc conn -0.0194*** 0.0059 0.0011 0.0423*** -0.0196*** -0.0070**
(0.0028) (0.0048) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0028) (0.0027)
WN adj ns 0.0284*** -0.0351* 0.0544*** -0.0533** 0.0188** 0.0271***
(0.0090) (0.0199) (0.0184) (0.0229) (0.0083) (0.0103)
otherlcc adj ns -0.0306*** -0.0105 -0.0180 -0.0092 -0.0329*** -0.0117
(0.0074) (0.0093) (0.0128) (0.0107) (0.0079) (0.0078)
ln(distance) 0.3323*** 0.1586*** 0.1931*** 0.2146 0.2849*** 0.0806***
(0.0084) (0.0130) (0.0702) (0.1334) (0.0083) (0.0072)
connect -0.0210*** 0.0228*** . . . .
(0.0026) (0.0039) . . . .
population 0.0443 -0.0244 -0.0018 -0.0522 0.0738** -0.0400
(0.0301) (0.0463) (0.0525) (0.0582) (0.0317) (0.0336)
real income 0.0010 -0.0037 -0.0084** -0.0038 0.0013 -0.0002
(0.0023) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0025) (0.0023)
earnings ratio -0.0664 -0.0987 0.2170 0.9250 0.0728 -0.2791
(0.3482) (0.4899) (0.7290) (0.6773) (0.3468) (0.3460)
nleg adj ns -0.0280*** 0.0050 0.0183** 0.0169*** -0.0363*** -0.0155***
(0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0084) (0.0061) (0.0055) (0.0049)
WN pot -0.0170** 0.0064 -0.0242 0.0171 -0.0158** -0.0211***
(0.0078) (0.0128) (0.0197) (0.0167) (0.0074) (0.0075)
otherlcc pot 0.0229 0.0424** 0.0641* 0.0370 0.0087 0.0076
(0.0206) (0.0189) (0.0377) (0.0229) (0.0224) (0.0149)
WN adj pot -0.0009 -0.0384*** 0.0077 -0.0417** -0.0031 0.0015
(0.0077) (0.0132) (0.0195) (0.0169) (0.0073) (0.0076)
otherlcc adj pot -0.0264 -0.0393* -0.0274 -0.0432 -0.0218 -0.0156
(0.0168) (0.0213) (0.0301) (0.0276) (0.0179) (0.0131)
nleg adj connect 0.0000 0.0085*** -0.0046 0.0096** 0.0031 0.0036*
(0.0018) (0.0030) (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0020) (0.0019)
WN adj connect 0.0170*** 0.0016 0.0154 -0.0020 0.0137** 0.0130**
(0.0063) (0.0083) (0.0121) (0.0093) (0.0063) (0.0064)
otherlcc adj connect -0.0068 0.0196*** -0.0035 0.0230*** -0.0074 0.0026
(0.0048) (0.0075) (0.0082) (0.0088) (0.0049) (0.0046)
Constant 3.0216*** 4.3728*** 3.0745*** 4.1719*** 3.2861*** 4.9712***
(0.1020) (0.2310) (0.1475) (0.1881) (0.1012) (0.1150)
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates for the additional competition and market variables used in the regressions comparing nonstop and
connecting competition with bag fees. The columns match those in Table 1.6.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.5: Competition and Market Variables for the Fare Percentile Regressions
20th Percentile Fare 50th Percentile Fare 80th Percentile Fare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
weighted weighted weighted
leg ns comp1 -0.0378*** -0.0408*** -0.0430*** -0.0540*** -0.0747*** -0.0727***
(0.0038) (0.0051) (0.0041) (0.0055) (0.0048) (0.0070)
leg ns comp2 -0.0201*** -0.0146* -0.0311*** -0.0246*** -0.0612*** -0.0453***
(0.0063) (0.0083) (0.0068) (0.0091) (0.0082) (0.0124)
leg ns comp3 0.0180 -0.0257* -0.0179 -0.0473*** -0.0635*** -0.1625***
(0.0156) (0.0144) (0.0155) (0.0127) (0.0210) (0.0386)
leg connect comp1 0.0139*** 0.0329*** 0.0239*** 0.0399*** 0.0274*** 0.0522***
(0.0027) (0.0044) (0.0026) (0.0042) (0.0029) (0.0046)
leg connect comp2 -0.0052*** 0.0004 -0.0007 0.0064** -0.0097*** 0.0062*
(0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0019) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0033)
leg connect comp3 0.0024 0.0076*** 0.0063*** 0.0124*** 0.0004 0.0106***
(0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0030)
leg connect comp4m 0.0079** 0.0154*** 0.0106*** 0.0221*** 0.0030 0.0149***
(0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0036) (0.0044)
WN ns -0.0581*** -0.1418*** -0.0391*** -0.1262*** -0.0497*** -0.1220***
(0.0062) (0.0124) (0.0063) (0.0123) (0.0065) (0.0146)
otherlcc ns -0.0302*** -0.0878*** -0.0281*** -0.0852*** -0.0357*** -0.0958***
(0.0060) (0.0083) (0.0057) (0.0094) (0.0058) (0.0112)
WN connect -0.0302*** -0.0573*** -0.0288*** -0.0564*** -0.0297*** -0.0485***
(0.0048) (0.0087) (0.0049) (0.0086) (0.0050) (0.0096)
otherlcc connect -0.0149*** -0.0129*** -0.0077*** 0.0075 -0.0130*** 0.0113*
(0.0030) (0.0044) (0.0029) (0.0051) (0.0030) (0.0062)
WN adj ns 0.0091 -0.0523* 0.0286*** -0.0359 0.0322*** -0.0352
(0.0095) (0.0298) (0.0098) (0.0289) (0.0100) (0.0229)
otherlcc adj ns -0.0324*** -0.0249** -0.0274*** -0.0213** -0.0201** 0.0090
(0.0089) (0.0101) (0.0079) (0.0100) (0.0087) (0.0140)
ln(distance) 0.1983*** 0.1068*** 0.2945*** 0.1444*** 0.3081*** 0.1372***
(0.0085) (0.0109) (0.0087) (0.0115) (0.0092) (0.0164)
connect -0.0029 0.0359*** -0.0170*** 0.0478*** -0.0306*** 0.0159***
(0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0035) (0.0031) (0.0054)
population 0.0235 -0.0529 0.0567* -0.0259 0.0830** 0.0101
(0.0335) (0.0791) (0.0308) (0.0585) (0.0334) (0.0544)
income -0.0111*** -0.0144*** -0.0079*** -0.0087** 0.0023 -0.0011
(0.0026) (0.0051) (0.0024) (0.0036) (0.0028) (0.0057)
earnings ratio -0.5238 -0.1638 -0.2129 0.4234 -0.0748 -0.1446
(0.3670) (0.6278) (0.3800) (0.6102) (0.3950) (0.6069)
nleg adj ns -0.0220*** 0.0013 -0.0195*** 0.0129** -0.0226*** 0.0059
(0.0044) (0.0063) (0.0046) (0.0059) (0.0053) (0.0066)
WN pot -0.0161** 0.0099 -0.0208*** 0.0085 -0.0248*** 0.0043
(0.0073) (0.0164) (0.0075) (0.0163) (0.0085) (0.0150)
otherlcc pot 0.0056 0.0001 0.0083 0.0388 0.0032 0.0478*
(0.0259) (0.0277) (0.0223) (0.0275) (0.0268) (0.0268)
WN adj pot -0.0034 -0.0429** 0.0020 -0.0415** 0.0052 -0.0397**
(0.0075) (0.0184) (0.0075) (0.0182) (0.0084) (0.0155)
otherlcc adj pot -0.0110 -0.0074 -0.0195 -0.0427 -0.0227 -0.0502*
(0.0206) (0.0267) (0.0201) (0.0290) (0.0269) (0.0269)
nleg adj connect 0.0012 0.0114*** 0.0000 0.0111*** -0.0012 0.0064
(0.0019) (0.0040) (0.0019) (0.0036) (0.0020) (0.0041)
WN adj connect 0.0046 -0.0130 0.0193*** -0.0012 0.0250*** 0.0062
(0.0064) (0.0114) (0.0066) (0.0104) (0.0074) (0.0091)
otherlcc adj connect -0.0065 0.0345*** -0.0007 0.0323*** -0.0044 0.0164*
(0.0056) (0.0118) (0.0052) (0.0105) (0.0053) (0.0099)
constant 3.7246*** 4.5807*** 3.1730*** 4.3364*** 3.2718*** 4.5567***
(0.1117) (0.3835) (0.1063) (0.2828) (0.1162) (0.2779)
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates for the additional competition and market variables used in the fare percentile regressions. The columns
match those in Table 1.7.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.6: Competition and Market Variables for
the Southwest Markets Regressions
(1) (2)
weighted
leg ns comp1 -0.0580*** -0.0605***
(0.0040) (0.0053)
leg ns comp2 -0.0482*** -0.0349***
(0.0070) (0.0091)
leg ns comp3 -0.0454** -0.1556***
(0.0210) (0.0392)
leg connect comp1 0.0193*** 0.0430***
(0.0026) (0.0036)
leg connect comp2 -0.0079*** 0.0030
(0.0019) (0.0026)
leg connect comp3 -0.0050** 0.0063**
(0.0020) (0.0026)
leg connect comp4m -0.0006 0.0119***
(0.0033) (0.0038)
WN ns -0.0403*** -0.0988***
(0.0088) (0.0121)
otherlcc ns -0.0429*** -0.0946***
(0.0055) (0.0087)
WN conn -0.0246*** -0.0328***
(0.0082) (0.0102)
otherlcc conn -0.0206*** 0.0016
(0.0028) (0.0048)
WN adj ns 0.0321*** -0.0332*
(0.0090) (0.0199)
otherlcc adj ns -0.0314*** -0.0114
(0.0075) (0.0093)
ln(distance) 0.3327*** 0.1586***
(0.0084) (0.0130)
connect -0.0208*** 0.0226***
(0.0026) (0.0040)
population 0.0841*** 0.0162
(0.0295) (0.0452)
income -0.0019 -0.0059*
(0.0023) (0.0036)
earnings ratio -0.1662 -0.1611
(0.3520) (0.4845)
nleg adj ns -0.0282*** 0.0059
(0.0049) (0.0050)
WN pot -0.0169** 0.0071
(0.0079) (0.0127)
otherlcc pot 0.0267 0.0425**
(0.0218) (0.0190)
WN adj pot -0.0020 -0.0384***
(0.0078) (0.0132)
otherlcc adj pot -0.0289* -0.0404*
(0.0174) (0.0215)
nleg adj connect -0.0005 0.0087***
(0.0018) (0.0030)
WN adj connect 0.0222*** 0.0040
(0.0063) (0.0083)
otherlcc adj connect -0.0063 0.0204***
(0.0048) (0.0076)
constant 2.9703*** 4.2663***
(0.1028) (0.2279)
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates for the additional com-
petition and market variables used in the Southwest markets regres-
sions. The columns match those in Table 1.8.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.7: Competition and Market Variables for the Regressions Excluding Southwest
Average Fare 20th Percentile Fare 80th Percentile Fare
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
weighted weighted weighted
leg ns comp1 -0.0594*** -0.0674*** -0.0380*** -0.0433*** -0.0776*** -0.0863***
(0.0041) (0.0059) (0.0039) (0.0055) (0.0050) (0.0079)
leg ns comp2 -0.0489*** -0.0375*** -0.0204*** -0.0117 -0.0620*** -0.0513***
(0.0072) (0.0086) (0.0064) (0.0081) (0.0086) (0.0120)
leg ns comp3 -0.0401* -0.1581*** 0.0269* -0.0189 -0.0616*** -0.1756***
(0.0222) (0.0402) (0.0163) (0.0147) (0.0221) (0.0417)
leg connect comp1 0.0212*** 0.0448*** 0.0144*** 0.0353*** 0.0269*** 0.0499***
(0.0028) (0.0041) (0.0028) (0.0049) (0.0031) (0.0054)
leg connect comp2 -0.0102*** -0.0049* -0.0051** -0.0059** -0.0118*** -0.0029
(0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0028) (0.0022) (0.0037)
leg connect comp3 -0.0069*** -0.0009 0.0017 0.0015 -0.0014 0.0033
(0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0032)
leg connect comp4m -0.0020 0.0034 0.0064 0.0084* 0.0009 0.0057
(0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0040) (0.0053)
WN ns -0.0435*** -0.1149*** -0.0631*** -0.1479*** -0.0341*** -0.1078***
(0.0069) (0.0144) (0.0080) (0.0166) (0.0077) (0.0187)
otherlcc ns -0.0398*** -0.0948*** -0.0251*** -0.0844*** -0.0320*** -0.0986***
(0.0057) (0.0095) (0.0061) (0.0088) (0.0059) (0.0124)
WN connect -0.0108** -0.0127** -0.0190*** -0.0232*** -0.0083 -0.0078
(0.0049) (0.0063) (0.0054) (0.0076) (0.0053) (0.0075)
otherlcc connect -0.0236*** -0.0066 -0.0159*** -0.0198*** -0.0162*** 0.0014
(0.0029) (0.0052) (0.0031) (0.0047) (0.0032) (0.0068)
WN adj ns -0.0133 -0.0494** -0.0166 -0.0668** -0.0175* -0.0467**
(0.0091) (0.0197) (0.0114) (0.0318) (0.0103) (0.0232)
otherlcc adj ns -0.0315*** -0.0039 -0.0342*** -0.0185* -0.0189** 0.0160
(0.0076) (0.0105) (0.0092) (0.0107) (0.0089) (0.0163)
ln(distance) 0.3272*** 0.1519*** 0.1837*** 0.0913*** 0.3049*** 0.1433***
(0.0086) (0.0143) (0.0084) (0.0113) (0.0094) (0.0186)
connect -0.0262*** 0.0152*** -0.0073** 0.0316*** -0.0377*** 0.0057
(0.0032) (0.0050) (0.0032) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0071)
population 0.0851*** 0.0130 0.0318 -0.0833 0.0904** 0.0042
(0.0315) (0.0514) (0.0355) (0.0809) (0.0357) (0.0637)
income -0.0003 -0.0034 -0.0095*** -0.0169*** 0.0027 0.0029
(0.0025) (0.0040) (0.0028) (0.0055) (0.0030) (0.0067)
earnings ratio -0.0122 -0.4863 -0.4892 -0.4360 -0.1006 -0.3278
(0.3581) (0.5209) (0.3714) (0.6465) (0.4039) (0.6540)
nleg adj ns -0.0312*** 0.0006 -0.0240*** -0.0044 -0.0258*** 0.0053
(0.0052) (0.0061) (0.0047) (0.0073) (0.0055) (0.0082)
WN pot 0.0095 0.0113 -0.0051 0.0142 0.0069 0.0081
(0.0078) (0.0124) (0.0085) (0.0170) (0.0082) (0.0147)
otherlcc pot 0.0239 0.0379** 0.0042 0.0122 0.0026 0.0390*
(0.0218) (0.0161) (0.0268) (0.0322) (0.0287) (0.0225)
WN adj pot -0.0227*** -0.0428*** -0.0150* -0.0493** -0.0183** -0.0436***
(0.0077) (0.0129) (0.0087) (0.0195) (0.0081) (0.0153)
otherlcc adj pot -0.0284 -0.0262 -0.0065 -0.0002 -0.0203 -0.0366*
(0.0177) (0.0160) (0.0218) (0.0285) (0.0288) (0.0215)
nleg adj connect 0.0000 0.0080** 0.0011 0.0090** -0.0010 0.0065
(0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0021) (0.0043) (0.0022) (0.0049)
WN adj connect 0.0043 -0.0002 -0.0018 -0.0138 0.0098 0.0059
(0.0062) (0.0083) (0.0068) (0.0115) (0.0072) (0.0093)
otherlcc adj connect -0.0082 0.0209*** -0.0070 0.0350*** -0.0047 0.0190*
(0.0050) (0.0080) (0.0059) (0.0125) (0.0055) (0.0110)
constant 2.9913*** 4.3261*** 3.7984*** 4.9467*** 3.2880*** 4.5103***
(0.1081) (0.2670) (0.1163) (0.4082) (0.1224) (0.3417)
Notes: The table shows coefficient estimates for the additional competition and market variables used in the regressions excluding Southwest. The
columns match those in Table 1.9.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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